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INTRODUCTION
In pursuit of jobs and new tax revenue, it has become
commonplace for North Carolina local governments to make
incentive payments to private companies.' The incentive payments
are meant to induce companies to locate facilities and operations-
with their accompanying jobs and capital investment-in the granting
government's jurisdiction. One survey "indicated that more than 40%
of North Carolina local governments employ cash incentives for
1. See Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For Better or
for Worse, POPULAR GOv'T, Winter 2009, at 17-20.
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business recruitment." 2 Nationwide, state and local governments pour
upwards of $80 billion annually into this effort.' North Carolina is
estimated to spend $660 million on incentives per year.4
In the typical local government cash incentive arrangement, a
grantor local government offers a cash grant or series of annual cash
grants to a company.' In exchange, the company agrees to create jobs
and make a capital investment (usually by constructing a building or
other facility and installing machinery and equipment) that increases
the local government's tax base.6 The total amount of the cash grants
is usually less than the property taxes to be paid by the company over
the term of the agreement, thus ensuring that the local government
realizes some net gain in tax revenue.' No grants are paid until the
local government verifies that the company has fulfilled its job
creation and capital investment obligations under the agreement.'
These incentive grants are commonly paid directly to a private
company and, therefore, are distinct from more general expenditures
related to economic development, such as investing in public
2. Tyler Mulligan, Did the NC Supreme Court Put Cash Economic Development
Incentives in Jeopardy?, COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV. IN N.C. & BEYOND (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://ced.sog.unc.edu/?p=4358; see generally JONATHAN Q. MORGAN, THE ROLE OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SURVEY FINDINGS FROM NORTH
CAROLINA 5 (2009), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs
/rolelocalgoved09.pdf (providing survey data from North Carolina local governments and
detailing staff capacity and economic development targets within jurisdictions).
3. See Louise Story, The Empty Promise of Tax Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012,
at Al; see also Marcia Clemmitt, Attracting Jobs: Do Tax Breaks for Businesses Spur
Employment?, 22 CQ RESEARCHER 205, 205 (2012) (describing and estimating the
amount of economic development incentives paid by state and local governments
nationwide).
4. See How Do North Carolina Tax Incentives Stack Up Nationally?, UNDER THE
DOME BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://projects.newsobserver.com/node/26488.
5. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619
(1996).
6. See id.; see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW FOR
NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 14 (2000) (explaining that some local
governments offer incentive grants to companies that agree to invest in "a new facility or
the expansion of an existing facility").
7. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also LAWRENCE, supra note
6, at 14 (describing local government incentive policies that "approach tax abatements in
effect" by tying "the amount of the cash grant specifically to the amount of property taxes
paid by the company").
8. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also LAWRENCE, supra note
6, at 14 ("These policies do not entitle companies to these grants. Rather they set out the
minimum criteria for receiving grants .. . with factors other than investment playing a role
in whether a grant is made and how large it is. These factors include the number of jobs
created by the investment, the types of jobs created, the potential for further investment




infrastructure, providing supportive services to local entrepreneurs
and startup companies, marketing the assets of a particular
jurisdiction, and hiring professional staff to coordinate economic
development activities.' The fact that incentives are, by design,
payments to a single private company, rather than expenditures for
projects of general benefit,10 has been the subject of legal challenges
claiming that incentives primarily benefit the private recipient and,
therefore, fail to serve a public purpose."
Starting in 1996, North Carolina courts have turned back
challenges to local government incentives, beginning with the
landmark case of Maready v. City of Winston-Salem.12 In Maready,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered a challenge to
"twenty-four economic development incentive projects" involving
payments by Forsyth County or the City of Winston-Salem to private
companies to induce those companies to locate facilities and jobs in
those jurisdictions.13 The "projected investment by the City and
County in these projects totaled approximately $13,200,000" in
exchange for an estimated "increase in the local tax base of
$238,593,000 and a projected creation of over 5,500 new jobs."14
Plaintiffs challenged the incentives on the basis that the General
Statutes of North Carolina ("G.S.") § 158-7.1, "which authorizes local
governments to make economic development incentive grants to
private corporations, is unconstitutional because it violates the public
purpose clause of the North Carolina Constitution."" In analysis that
will be reviewed in greater detail later in this Article, the majority
held that G.S. 158-7.1 "does not violate the public purpose clause of
the North Carolina Constitution." 16
9. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 39-50.
10. Advertising the benefits of locating in a jurisdiction to prospective companies is an
example of an economic development expenditure for general benefit. See, e.g., Dennis v.
City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 405, 116 S.E.2d 923, 927 (1960) ("The appropriation
authorized by the charter provision is for advertising to promote the public interest and
general welfare of the City. The resolution of the Raleigh City Council contains no
suggestion that the fund will be expended for any other purpose. There is no allegation
that the contemplated advertising is for the purpose of promoting private business or
property interests. Absent an attack on such ground, it must be assumed that no
expenditure will be approved by the Raleigh City Council unless it be within the authority
granted by the charter provision. The court below held the appropriation was for a public
purpose. We agree.").
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996).
13. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 618-19.
14. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
15. Id. at 712, 467 S.E.2d at 618.
16. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627; see infra Part I.B.
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Since Maready, two North Carolina Court of Appeals cases,
Blinson v. State" and Haugh v. County of Durham," have upheld
local government cash inducements and other incentives for industrial
recruitment under G.S. 158-7.1 that were deemed "parallel" to the
incentives approved in Maready.9 However, these cases dealt only
with incentives that were indistinguishable from the incentives at
issue in Maready20-what this Article refers to as the "classic"
incentive scenario: inducements for major facilities in which the
public benefit consists of significant capital investment by the
company and the creation of a substantial number of jobs. Maready
settled the matter on cash incentives in this "classic" context, stating
they were permissible.2' But what about other incentive requests from
business entities that do not fit this classic mold? The classic industrial
employer is not the only private actor clamoring for incentives today;
local governments now occasionally field incentives requests from
real estate developers and retail operations.2 2 The task of evaluating
vastly different incentive requests is further complicated by the
existence of several unconnected sources of statutory authority for
development incentives-such as economic development,23
community development, 24 urban redevelopment,25 and municipal
service districts for downtown revitalization and urban
revitalization 26-each with its own set of purposes and limitations.
To help local governments determine which incentives rest on a
solid legal foundation and which are questionable, this Article takes
stock of the statutory amendments and case law since Maready in
17. 186 N.C. App. 328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007).
18. 208 N.C. App. 304, 702 S.E.2d 814 (2010).
19. See id. at 319, 702 S.E.2d at 824 ("Incentives parallel to those at issue already
have been held to comport to the Public Purpose Clauses of our State Constitution in view
of the test articulated in Madison Cablevision, and we are bound by that precedent.").
20. See Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 338, 651 S.E.2d at 276 ("In the absence of a showing
of some distinction between the incentives in this case and the incentives in the Maready
case, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that the County and City Resolutions
and the Agreement did not violate the Public Purpose Clauses.").
21. Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 729-30, 467 S.E.2d at 627-28.
22. For hypothetical scenarios derived from the author's experience, see Tyler
Mulligan, Local Government Assistance for a Real Estate Development Project-Without
Making a Grant, COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOc. GOv'T L. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:17
AM), http://canons.sog.unc.edul?p=6848 [hereinafter Mulligan, Local Government
Assistance]; Tyler Mulligan, Cash Economic Development Incentives for Capital
Investment Alone? Think Twice., COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG
(Sept. 21, 2010, 2:09 PM), http://canons.sog.unc.edul?p=3198.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 (2011).
24. Id. §§ 153A-376 (counties), 160A-456 (cities).
25. Id. §H 160A-500 to 534.
26. Id. § 160A-536.
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order to develop a consistent framework for analyzing incentive
requests by private companies.27 The framework will be evaluated
and constructed along three dimensions: allowable means for
incentives, required consideration for incentives, and procedural
requirements for approval of incentives.
In building and explaining the framework, this Article proceeds
in four parts. Part I describes the most commonly used statutory
authority for cash incentives, G.S. 158-7.1, and categorizes the key
statutory provisions along the three dimensions of the framework-
means, consideration, and procedural requirements. Part II then
examines the public purpose analysis found in Maready to determine
the outer bounds of permissible economic development incentives
under G.S. 158-7.1 along the same three dimensions. Part III
combines the analyses of the previous two sections into a single
framework for analyzing economic development incentives under
G.S. 158-7.1. Part IV applies the developed framework to two
hypothetical, but common incentive scenarios. This application
reveals that G.S. 158-7.1 is constrained and cannot be used by local
governments to offer cash incentives in every economic development
scenario. However, other sources of statutory authority can be
employed, and two alternatives are described in Part IV's conclusion.
This Article provides a clearer understanding of local government
authority to offer development incentives to private entities in a wide
variety of contexts using several different sources of statutory
authority.
Before proceeding further, it must be acknowledged that the
practice of offering incentives remains highly controversial in law and
policy circles. It has been almost two decades since the Supreme
Court of North Carolina affirmed the legality of incentives in
Maready, but, today, incentives continue to be the subject of
litigation,28 analysis,29 and controversy30 in the state. This Article
27. Professor David Lawrence wrote the most comprehensive text on North Carolina
economic development law since Maready. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6. It predates the
addition of subsection (h) to G.S. 158-7.1. See Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 515, § 7, 2007 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1657, 1660 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(h) (2011)). His
text also predates Blinson and Haugh.
28. See, e.g., Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 702 S.E.2d 814 (2010);
Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 651 S.E.2d 268 (2007); Rochelle Moore, Sanderson
Farms Nixes Nash County Poultry Plant, KINSTON.COM (Nov. 14, 2012, 8:44 PM),
http://www.kinston.com/news/locallsanderson-farms-nixes-nash-county-poultry-plant-
1.49812.
29. See, e.g., Jeanette K. Doran, The People Versus Corporate Welfare: North
Carolina's Forsaken Opportunity to Reverse Perversion of the Commerce Clause and to
Reinvigorate the Public Purpose Doctrine, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 381, 383 (2011) ("[T]his
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places the ongoing debate about incentives to the side in order to
provide useful analysis to local governments that choose to engage in
the practice of offering economic development incentives.
I. EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF SECTION 158-7.1
Our exploration of economic development incentives begins with
the authorizing statute, G.S. 158-7.1, which was the focus of Maready.
Section A of this Part describes the central importance of the
statutory grants of authority to North Carolina local governments in
determining what activities those governments may undertake.
Section B then narrows the focus to G.S. 158-7.1, breaking that
particular statutory grant of authority down into its component parts
and describing each major element. Section C concludes Part I by
organizing the major components of G.S. 158-7.1 along the three
dimensions of this Article's proposed framework for analyzing
economic development incentives: means, consideration, and
procedural requirements.
A. The Importance of Statutory Grants of Authority for North
Carolina Local Governments
Local governments in North Carolina derive all their powers
from delegation by the State.31 The North Carolina Constitution
Article is calculated to recognize the efforts of taxpayers who have resorted to the very
constitutional rights afforded to them as citizens and taxpayers to challenge governmental
acts which are repugnant to the very foundations of our society and to encourage the
judiciary to fulfill its duty to reject legislation which is contrary to the state or federal
constitution."); Sherry L. Jarrell et al., Economic Development Incentives and the Legal
and Economic Issues of Open Versus Sealed Bids, 7 S.C. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 227, 227 (2011);
Jason Jolley, Patrick McHugh & Dianne Reid, Incentives 2.0, 10 ECON. DEV. J. 28, 28-35
(2011); Anne C. Choe, Recent Development, Blinson v. State and the Continued Erosion
of the Public Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 644, 645 (2009)
("Robert F. Orr, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, representing
the North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, challenged the incentives given to
Dell to build a manufacturing plant near Winston-Salem.").
30. See, e.g., Richard Craver, Incentives: Beneficial or Bluffs?, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
July 1, 2012, at Al; T. William Lester, Nichola J. Lowe & Allan M. Freyer, Mediated
Incentives: Making North Carolina's Economic Development Incentive Programs Work
Better Through Strategic Investments, 18 BTC REP. 1, 2 (Oct. 2012), available at
http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/BTC%20Reports%20-
%20Mediated%20Incentives 0.pdf; Story, supra note 3; How Do North Carolina Tax
Incentives Stack Up Nationally?, supra note 4.
31. For a discussion of municipal authority and its evolution in North Carolina, see
Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1983, 1989-90 (2006); see also David Owens, Local Government Authority to
Implement Smart Growth Programs: Dillon's Rule, Legislative Reform and the Current
2028 [Vol. 91
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states: "The General Assembly ... may give such powers and duties
to counties, cities, and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as
it may deem advisable." 32 Thus, North Carolina local governments are
"creatures of legislative benevolence-not constitutional mandate." 3
It is therefore necessary to identify a grant of statutory authority for
all activities undertaken by North Carolina local governments.
A grant of authority can be general in nature and need not
delineate every permissible activity. Every statutory grant of power to
local governments also includes a parallel grant of implied powers "to
include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably
necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect." 34
This grant of implied powers is stated explicitly in G.S. 153A-4,
pertaining to counties, and G.S. 160A-4, pertaining to municipalities.
Due to the relationship between G.S. 153A-4 and G.S. 160A-4 (the
"broad construction statutes") and local government authority under
G.S. 158-7.1, described immediately below, the broad construction
statutes warrant further explanation.
Each of the broad construction statutes contains two elements:
(1) an explicit grant of implied powers just described in the previous
paragraph, and (2) a rule of statutory construction to be applied by
courts when interpreting provisions of charters and statutes.36 In
State of Affairs in North Carolina, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 680-700 (2000)
(describing the evolution of municipal authority in North Carolina).
32. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
33. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Elections v. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 212 N.C. App.
313, 317, 712 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also A.
Fleming Bell, II, Article 4: The Police Power, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 2 (2007), available at www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmg04.pdf
("North Carolina is not a 'home rule' state, as that term is commonly understood. Its local
governments exist by legislative benevolence, not by constitutional mandate."); Tyler
Mulligan, Toward a Comprehensive Program for Regulating Vacant or Abandoned
Dwellings in North Carolina: The General Police Power, Minimum Housing Standards,
and Vacant Property Registration, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) ("In North Carolina,
local governments are creatures of legislative benevolence-not constitutional mandate.").
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2011); see also id. § 153A-4 ("To this end, the
provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly construed and grants of power
shall be construed to include any powers that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of
the power.").
35. Id. § 153A-4 ("[G]rants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are
reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power."); id. § 160A-4 ("[G]rants of power
shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are
reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect .... ").
36. Id. § 153A-4 ("[Tihe provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly
construed .... "); id. § 160A-4 ("[T]he provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall
be broadly construed . . . .").
2013] 2029
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Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte," the Supreme
Court of North Carolina relied on the broad construction statutes to
uphold the city's authority to impose user fees for a variety of city
services, even though the city had no express statutory authority to
impose them."
In Maready, the Supreme Court of North Carolina likewise
referred to the broad construction statutes when it identified in G.S.
158-7.1 a "legislative purpose to give local governments considerable
flexibility and discretion to execute the perceived public purpose of
economic development."" This determination in Maready has not
been overruled, but recent court decisions have created uncertainty
about the role of the broad construction statutes and, therefore, merit
brief mention here.40
Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus,4 1 a 2012
Supreme Court of North Carolina case, involved a dispute over local
government authority to enact an adequate public facilities ordinance
("APFO").4 2 An APFO uses local government zoning and land use
powers to tie approval of a particular development to the existence of
public facilities that are necessary to service the proposed
development.4 3 In Lanvale, the court declined to find implied
authority for an APFO within a county's general grant of authority
for zoning." The county urged the court to find authority by applying
the applicable broad construction statute, but the majority declined to
do so, describing G.S. 153A-4 as "a rule of statutory construction
rather than a general directive to give our general zoning statutes the
37. 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (1994).
38. Id. at 42, 442 S.E.2d at 49 ("The generally accepted rule today seems to be that the
municipal power to regulate an activity implies the power to impose a fee in an amount
sufficient to cover the cost of regulation."); see also Maready v. City of Winston-Salem,
342 N.C. 708, 729, 467 S.E.2d 615, 628 (1996) ("In Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City
of Charlotte, this Court applied the broad rule of construction in [G.S.] 160A-4 in holding
that the City of Charlotte possessed the authority and discretion to charge user fees for
regulatory services even though there was no express statutory authority therefor."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
39. Maready, 342 N.C. at 729, 467 S.E.2d at 628-29.
40. For further analysis of the uncertainty surrounding the broad construction
statutes, see Mulligan, supra note 2.
41. 336 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012).
42. Id. at 143, 731 S.E.2d at 803.
43. See David Owens, If We Can't Collect a Fee, Can We Just Say No? Use of Impact
Fees and Adequate Public Facility Regulatory Requirements, COATES' CANONS: N.C.
LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=3340
("Development is not permitted at a particular site unless and until a defined level of
public services is available.").
44. Lanvale, 336 N.C. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
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broadest construction possible."45 According to the majority opinion,
G.S. 153A-4's rule of broad construction should be applied only when
"statutes are ambiguous."46 The dissent, siding with the county,
argued that the zoning statutes in question were indeed ambiguous
regarding the limits of the county's zoning authority.4 7 The majority
disagreed, holding that the zoning statutes in question were not
ambiguous, therefore obviating the need to apply G.S. 153A-4.4 8
Having determined that the broad construction statutes were not
applicable, the court then concluded there was no implied authority
for the county's APFO.4 9
The court's reluctance to apply the broad construction statutes,
upon which Maready relied, raises the following question: Does
Lanvale undercut the authority of local governments to offer cash
economic development incentives pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1? There
are several reasons to think not. First and foremost, Maready remains
good law. The Lanvale court acknowledged that its application of the
broad construction statutes in zoning cases had been "inconsistent," 0
but it did not discuss economic development and it did not overrule
Maready-in fact, the court did not mention Maready at all.
Second, while the majority in Lanvale did suggest that the call for
broad construction "is a rule of statutory construction" to be applied
"only when ... statutes are ambiguous," the majority opinion also
appeared to recognize the important distinction between the two
45. Id. at 154, 731 S.E.2d at 809.
46. Id. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
47. See id. at 173, 731 S.E.2d at 821 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the language
in the zoning statutes, G.S. 153A-340(a) and G.S. 153A-341, "is not plain"). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-340 (2011) ("A zoning ordinance may regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that
may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of
population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry,
residence, or other purposes."); id. § 153A-341 ("Zoning regulations shall be designed to
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. To that end, the regulations may
address, among other things, the following public purposes: to provide adequate light and
air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and to
facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements. The regulations shall be made with reasonable
consideration as to, among other things, the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the county. In addition, the
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration to expansion and development of
any cities within the county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and development.").
48. Lanvale, 336 N.C. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 153, 731 S.E.2d at 809.
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parts of the broad construction statutes: one part pertaining to
construction of ambiguous statutory provisions and a separate part
pertaining to implied powers." That is, the Lanvale majority stated
that the broad construction rule applies in two circumstances: (1)
"when our zoning statutes are ambiguous" and (2) "when its
application is necessary to give effect to 'any powers that are
reasonably expedient to [a local government's] exercise of [a general
grant of] power.' "52
In making this distinction, the court may be recognizing that
ambiguity in a statute, which requires a court to apply rules of
statutory construction, may be different from finding implied powers
that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of a general grant of
authority. A general grant of authority can be quite clear with respect
to its plain meaning, but packed within that general grant of authority
may be a host of implied powers that are not immediately evident."
In this context, perhaps the meaning of G.S. 153A-4 and G.S. 160A-4
is that, whenever such a general grant of authority is made, the
legislature has explicitly granted all of the implied powers as well.54
This distinction makes it possible to square the holding in
Lanvale with Maready because G.S. 158-7.1 is one of those general
grants of authority packed with implied powers-powers that permit
each local government to design a wide variety of economic
development activities to suit its particular needs, whether or not the
activity is explicitly listed in the statute." Properly understood, G.S.
153A-4 and G.S. 160A-4 combine with G.S. 158-7.1 to provide a
general grant of authority and all of the implied powers associated
with that general grant. Accordingly, there is no need for G.S. 158-7.1
51. See id. at 154-55, 731 S.E.2d at 809-10.
52. Id. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
53. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 45,
442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994) (relying on the implied powers portion of G.S. 160A-4 to uphold
the city's imposition of fees for regulatory services); cf King v. Town of Chapel Hill, _
N.C. App. -, -, 743 S.E.2d 666, 673 (2013) (concluding that the general police power
statute, G.S. 160A-174, is ambiguous and employing the broad construction statute to
authorize the town's towing and mobile phone ordinances).
54. Professor Frayda Bluestein discussed the plain meaning of the broad construction
statutes in a recent blog post. See Frayda Bluestein, Is North Carolina a Dillon's Rule
State?, COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:26 PM),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6894.
55. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 729, 467 S.E.2d 615, 628
(1996) ("The statute leaves it to the duly elected governing bodies of the cities and




to suffer from ambiguity for a court to find its implied powers. Even
in Lanvale, the Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized that
G.S. 153A-4 and G.S. 160A-4 apply when "necessary to give effect"
to implied powers that are "reasonably expedient" to exercising a
general grant of authority.57
In summary, G.S. 158-7.1 provides a general grant of authority to
local governments for undertaking economic development activities.
Although this general grant of authority does not list every activity
permitted, such an explicit listing is not necessary. The broad
construction statutes, G.S. 153A-4 and G.S. 160A-4, contain an
explicit grant of all implied authorities associated with that general
grant of authority. Case law, from Maready to Lanvale, provides
additional support for concluding that implied powers are granted as
part of a general grant of authority. Given that G.S. 158-7.1 is, in
essence, a general grant of authority, the preceding analysis of
implied powers supplies the necessary context for further exploration
of the powers granted by G.S. 158-7.1.
B. Analysis of Section 158-7.1
As noted, the primary statutory authority for economic
development incentive expenditures is G.S. 158-7.1. That statute,
which in its original form was enacted as part of the Local
Development Act of 1925, at first glance appears breathtakingly
broad in scope. The authorized powers and associated procedural
requirements can be broken down by each subsection of the statute.
1. Catch-all Provision: Section 158-7.1(a)
G.S. 158-7.1 opens with a catch-all provision that authorizes local
governments to make appropriations for a seemingly unlimited set of
economic development activities. Specifically, subsection (a)
authorizes counties and cities
to make appropriations for the purposes of aiding and
encouraging the location of manufacturing enterprises, making
industrial surveys and locating industrial and commercial plants
in or near such city or in the county; encouraging the building
56. Perhaps general grants of authority are inherently ambiguous as well. In a North
Carolina Court of Appeals case decided in the wake of Lanvale, the court determined that
a general grant of authority with "far-reaching meanings" is ambiguous. See King v. Town
of Chapel Hill, - N.C. App. -, -, 743 S.E.2d 666, 673 (2013).
57. See Lanvale, 336 N.C. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
58. Act of Feb. 19, 1925, ch. 33, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 20 (codified as amended in N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 158-1 to -7.4 (2011)).
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of railroads or other purposes which, in the discretion of the
governing body of the city or of the county commissioners of
the county, will increase the population, taxable property,
agricultural industries and business prospects of any city or
county.59
By the bare terms of the statute-particularly the italicized
language above-it is difficult to say what appropriations are not
permitted under the catch-all provision. The first half of the provision
appears somewhat constrained, being limited to what might be
considered conventional economic development recruitment
activities ("encouraging the location of manufacturing enterprises"
and locating facilities in or near the jurisdiction). The second half of
the provision, however, appears to grant unbridled discretion to
governing boards, explicitly authorizing boards to use public funds for
"other purposes" at the "discretion of the governing body." The list of
desired ends to be achieved-increasing the population, taxable
property, agricultural industries, and business prospects-might seem
a challenging threshold to overcome at first blush, except that the
language is diluted at the end of the clause. The listed ends can be
achieved in "any" city or county-not merely in the city or county
making the appropriation.60 Perhaps the rather unbounded nature of
this catch-all language is the reason that the Maready court was rather
dismissive of this particular clause, describing it as a "self-proclaimed
end" of the statute rather than imbuing it with significant meaning.61
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
60. The "any city" language has always been part of the statute, appearing even in the
original version enacted in 1925. See Act of Feb. 19, 1925, ch. 33, §§ 1, 3, 6, 1925 N.C. Sess.
Laws 20, 20-23 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(a) (2011)); cf. Horner
v. Chamber of Commerce of Burlington, Inc., 235 N.C. 77, 80-81, 68 S.E.2d 660, 662
(1952) (describing-not directly quoting-the language in the statute less ambitiously as
"for the purpose of aiding and encouraging the location of manufacturing enterprises,
making industrial surveys and locating industrial and commercial plants in or near the city;
encouraging the building of railroads thereto, and for such other purposes as will, in the
discretion of the governing body of the city, increase the population, taxable property,
agricultural industries, and business prospects of the city" (emphasis added)).
61. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 724, 467 S.E.2d 615, 625 (1996).
The Maready court downplayed the significance of this clause, stating that the public
benefit of an incentive is obtained by a different set of factors, devised entirely by the
court: "providing displaced workers with continuing employment opportunities, attracting
better paying and more highly skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base, and diversifying the
economy." Id. ("[G.S. 158-7.1's] self-proclaimed end is to increase the population, taxable
property, agricultural industries and business prospects of any city or county. However, it
is the natural consequences flowing therefrom that ensure a net public benefit. The
expenditures this statute authorizes should create a more stable local economy by
providing displaced workers with continuing employment opportunities, attracting better
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Most of the language we currently see in the catch-all provision
survives from the original version of the statute.6 2 The original
enactment, however, contained two components: a grant of authority
to appropriate funds for economic development, and a requirement
that those appropriations be "used and expended under the direction
and control" of the governing board. The second component
regarding "direction and control" was apparently rewritten and
moved to G.S. 158-7.2, which requires that expenditures of funds
appropriated pursuant to the Local Development Act by "any agency
or organization other than the county or city" must be approved by
the governing board and "shall be accounted for by the agency or
organization at the end of the fiscal year for which they were
appropriated."' Thus, G.S. 158-7.2 does not constrain a local
government's creativity in designing its economic development
expenditures; it simply requires oversight of any funds turned over to
paying and more highly skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base, and diversifying the economy."
(interal quotation marks omitted)).
62. See Act of Feb. 19, 1925, ch, 33, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 20, 20-21 (codified as
amended in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-1 to -7.4 (2011)) ("That the mayor and board of
aldermen, or other governing body ... may annually set apart and appropriate from the
funds derived annually from the general taxes levied and collected ... which funds shall be
used and expended under the direction and control of the ... governing body ... under
such rules and regulations or through such agencies as they shall prescribe, for the purpose
of aiding and encouraging the location of manufacturing enterprises, making industrial
surveys and locating industrial and commercial plants in or near such city ... or in such
county; encouraging the building of railroads thereto, and for such other purposes as will,
in the discretion of the ... governing body of any city ... or the county commissioners of
any county, increase the population, taxable property, agricultural industries and business
prospects of any city, incorporated town, or any county.").
63. Id. at 20; see also Horner, 235 N.C. at 80-81, 68 S.E.2d at 662-63 (holding there
was evidentiary support for the trial judge's finding that a $2,000 appropriation to a city's
chamber of commerce was unlawful under G.S. 158-1 (the predecessor to G.S. 158-7.1 and
158-7.2), because the governing board did not exercise sufficient control over how the
chamber spent the funds).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.2 (2011) (emphasis added). The original "direction and
control" requirement of § 158-1 appeared to be rewritten and moved to § 158-7.2
following a 1973 recodification of the General Statutes of North Carolina. See Act of May
24, 1973, ch. 803, §§ 37, 38,1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1188, 1199 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
158-7.2 (2011)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 (1973 Supp.) (inserting new sections 158-7.1
and 158-7.2 rather than replacing sections 158-1 and 158-2 as directed by the session law).
The new language reads:
In the event funds appropriated for the purposes of this Article are turned over to
any agency or organization other than the county or city for expenditure, no such
expenditure shall be made until the county or city has approved the same, and all
such expenditures shall be accounted for by the agency or organization at the end
of the fiscal year for which they were appropriated.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.2 (2011).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
another entity.65 When a local government appropriates funds to a
private business as part of an economic development incentive grant
under G.S. 158-7.1, the recipient business is an "organization other
than the county or city,"66 and the expenditure is arguably subject to
the approval and accounting provisions of G.S. 158-7.2.
Outside of G.S. 158-7.2's approval and oversight mandate, there
are no procedural requirements explicitly imposed on appropriations
made pursuant to subsection (a)'s catch-all provision. No notice to
the public is required. No public meeting or hearing is mandated. No
findings of fact must be made. This absence of requirements for
expenditures under subsection (a) lies in stark contrast to those
falling within the scope of subsection (b), described below, which are
subject to several procedural requirements for approval."
2. Enumerated Powers Related to Land and Facilities: Section 158-
7.1(b)
Subsection (b) provides specific authority for the acquisition,
improvement, and conveyance of real property. The listing of powers
in this subsection "is not intended to limit by implication or otherwise
the grant of authority set out in subsection (a)." 6" The authority to
acquire, improve, and convey property under subsection (b) pertains
to the following activities:
1. Development of an industrial park designed for
purposes ranging from manufacturing to warehousing to
office use or "similar industrial or commercial
purposes."69
65. Professor David Lawrence suggests that compliance with G.S. 158-7.2 can be
accomplished by giving approval to the specific programmatic design of programs
undertaken by a nongovernmental entity such as "developing an economic development
plan, undertaking a program to visit and support existing businesses, undertaking a
program of general business recruitment, or operating a microloan pool for small
businesses." LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 157. However, when a "nongovernmental entity
proposes to offer an incentive to a specific company or to engage in any of the projects
listed in G.S. 158-7.1(b) and to use county or city money to do so, [G.S. 158-7.2] probably
requires a discrete approval by the county or city of such a significant use of its funds." Id.;
see also infra Part I.B.2 (describing the projects listed in G.S. 158-7.1). Lawrence goes on
to say that such "approval might best be given after a public hearing that follows the
procedures of G.S. 158-7.1(c)." LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 157; see also infra Part I.B.3
(explaining the procedures required by G.S. 158-7.1(c)).
66. § 158-7.2.
67. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3, II.B.2.b.
68. § 158-7.1(b).
69. Id. § 158-7.1(b)(1).
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2. Acquisition, improvement, and conveyance of property
and buildings "suitable for industrial or commercial
use."" In our first hint of the importance of jobs, a city
is permitted to acquire property outside of city limits
within counties in which it is located, but only if the
property will be used by a business that will provide jobs
to city residents."
3. Extension of utilities for industrial facilities.72
4. Site preparation for industrial facilities.73
Appropriations, expenditures, and conveyances made under the
authority of subsection (b) are subject to procedures set forth in
subsections (c) and (d),74 discussed in the next section.
3. Procedural Requirements for Appropriations Authorized by
Subsection (b) and for Unsubsidized Conveyances of Property:
Sections 158-7.1(c) and (d)
Subsection (c) provides that any appropriations or expenditures
pursuant to subsection (b) must be approved by the governing body
after notice and a public hearing.75 The procedures of subsection (c),
which are imposed only on activities undertaken under subsection
(b), and not subsection (a), draw attention to a curious incongruity in
the statute.
To illustrate this incongruity, imagine two companies. The first
company intends to construct an industrial facility and requests that a
city provide utility extensions-a subsection (b) activity when
provided for an "industrial facility"-as an incentive.76 The second
company intends to construct a commercial facility that is not
classified as an "industrial facility," such as an office building that will
serve as the company's headquarters 77 and it too requests utility
extensions from the local government. The first company's utility
extensions clearly fall within the purview of subsection (b) and are
70. Id. § 158-7.1(b)(2)-(4).
71 See id. § 158-7.1(b)(2).
72. Id. § 158-7.1(b)(5)-(6).
73. Id. § 158-7.1(b)(7).
74. Id. § 158-7.1(c)-(d).
75. Id. § 158-7.1(c); see also Tyler Mulligan, Notice of Hearing for Cash Economic
Development Incentives, COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (Sept. 23,
2009, 7:04 AM), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=810 (describing the notice requirements of
G.S. 158-7.1 as applied to cash incentives).
76. See § 158-7.1(b)(5)-(6).
77. See id.
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therefore subject to subsection (c)'s strict notice and public hearing
procedures," whereas the second company's utility extensions for its
non-industrial facility fall outside of the subsection (b) list-but are
nonetheless authorized by subsection (a) 79 -and, curiously, are
subject to no procedural requirements at all.
A related question arises when a local government offers a cash
grant as an incentive: Is a cash incentive payment approved pursuant
to subsection (a) or subsection (b)? As explained later, Maready
suggests that cash grants paid to induce a company to perform
subsection (b) activities are approved pursuant to subsection (b) and
are therefore subject to procedural requirements associated with
subsection (b).o
Subsection (d) imposes procedural requirements on conveyances
of property. It authorizes local governments to "convey or lease
interests in property" provided the consideration received is no less
than the fair market value of the interest." Conveyance by "private
negotiation" is authorized,8 2 which means that the local government
may contract with a purchaser of its choice without following normal
competitive bidding procedures. 83 The benefit to the purchaser in
such a transaction is the avoidance of a bidding competition that
could raise the price of the property or result in the prospective
purchaser being outbid altogether. The trade-off for this benefit to
the purchaser is the imposition of additional procedural requirements
for approval of the conveyance: notice to the public, a public hearing
prior to approval of the sale, and a determination of the fair market
value of the interest to be conveyed.84 Subsection (d) plainly assumes
that jobs will be part of any such transaction: A conveyance for fair
market value may proceed only after the governing board determines
the "probable average hourly wage to be paid to workers by the
business to be located at the property to be conveyed.""
78. See id. § 158-7.1(c).
79. See id. § 158-7.1(a); see also supra Part I.B.1 (describing subsection(a)).
80. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
81. § 158-7.1(d).
82. Id.
83. See id. § 160A-267 (enumerating procedures for private negotiations and sale).
Competitive procedures available to municipalities include sealed bid, see id. § 160A-268,
upset bid, see id. § 160A-279, and public auction, see id. § 160A-270. Counties may avail
themselves of these procedures as well. See id. § 153A-176.
84. See id. § 158-7.1(d).
85. Id. This provision is yet another example of job creation being an assumed
component of an activity authorized pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1. Cf supra note 71 and
accompanying text (noting that G.S. 158-7.1(b)(2)-(4) authorizes extraterritorial
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4. Special Accounting Procedures for Subsidized Conveyances of
Property: Section 158-7.1(d2)
Subsection (d) allows a local government to convey or lease an
interest in property, provided the consideration received is "not ...
less than the [fair market] value" of the interest."6 Subsection (d2)
states, however, that "[i]n arriving at the amount of consideration that
it receives, [a governing board] may take into account ... prospective
tax revenues or income coming to the county or city over the next 10
years as a result of the conveyance or lease."" This permits local
governments to convey property without receiving full monetary
consideration-in essence, granting a subsidy to the purchaser-
provided the local government recoups the subsidy over time through
other revenues. This enhancement of private benefit, which takes the
form of a direct and quantifiable monetary subsidy to the purchaser,
is in addition to the private benefit obtained by the purchaser through
the avoidance of competitive bidding procedures under subsection
(d)."1 As a result, the procedural requirements for approval of a
subsidized conveyance under subsection (d2) are more substantial
than the requirements imposed by subsection (d).
Local governments making a subsidized conveyance under
subsection (d2) must comply with two additional procedural
requirements, and here again, the statute emphasizes job creation.
First, the governing body must determine "that the conveyance of the
property will stimulate the local economy, promote business, and
result in the creation of a substantial number of jobs in the county or
city that pay at or above the median average wage in the county."89
Second, the governing body "shall contractually bind the purchaser of
the property to construct, within ... five years, improvements on the
property" that will generate the promised tax revenue. 0 A recapture
mechanism must be incorporated such that, "[u]pon failure to
construct the improvements specified in the contract, the purchaser
acquisitions of industrial or commercial properties by municipalities only if the acquisition
results in the property providing jobs to city residents).
86. § 158-7.1(d); see also supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing the
procedural requirements for conveyances of property pursuant to subsection (d)).
87. § 158-7.1(d2).
88. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (describing the private benefit
obtained under subsection (d) by employing private sale procedures rather than
competitive bidding).
89. § 158-7.1(d2)(1) (emphasis added). Customarily, local governments use the
county's average wage as provided by the North Carolina Employment Security
Commission. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 109-10.
90. § 158-7.1(d2)(2).
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shall reconvey the property back to the county or city."91 Recapture
of the property can be enforced through one or more mechanisms,
including deed restrictions, a deed of trust, and by contract, though
the last option is considerably weaker than the first two.'
5. Fiscal Requirements and Local Government Commission
Reporting: Sections 158-7.1(e) and (f)
Subsection (e) subjects certain expenditures to fiscal control
measures.93 Subsection (f) imposes a maximum allowable amount of
expenditures by local governments for certain economic development
activities, such as real property expenditures authorized under
subsection (b). The maximum allowable amount is 0.5% of the
jurisdiction's outstanding assessed property tax valuation, and reports
on the listed expenditures must be provided to and reviewed by the
North Carolina Local Government Commission annually.94
6. Recapture Provisions Required in Incentive Agreements: Section
158-7.1(h)
Subsection (h), the most recent addition to G.S. 158-7.1,95
imposes requirements on "[e]ach economic development agreement
entered into between a private enterprise and a city or county,"9 6 and
its odd wording merits some analysis. To start, it is helpful to
understand that most economic development incentives are offered to
companies under terms set forth in a written contract or incentive
agreement.97 Indeed, a written contract was standard procedure for
the incentives at issue in Maready." Local governments enter into
91. Id.
92. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 70-71.
93. See § 158-7.1(e).
94. See id. § 158-7.1(f). A description of the reporting procedures can be found in
Professor Lawrence's text. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 73-76.
95. Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 515, § 7, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1657, 1660 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(h) (2011)).
96. § 158-7.1(h). While the term "economic development agreement" is not further
defined, presumably it includes all agreements made pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1, including
the contractual agreement required by G.S. 158-7.1(d2). See supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
97. See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 8 (reporting that a 2006 survey of North Carolina
local governments-conducted prior to the enactment of subsection (h)-indicated that
51.2% of respondent local governments always require a written agreement for incentive
transactions and another 14.3% sometimes do).
98. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619
(1996). In describing the "typical procedures" observed for the incentives at issue, the




incentive agreements for several reasons. First, contractual
agreements are required when local governments use the special
accounting provisions of subsection (d2) for subsidized conveyances
of property. 99 Second, when an incentive is paid to a company, the
appropriated funds are arguably "turned over to any agency or
organization other than the county or city for expenditure," and
thereby are subject to G.S. 158-7.2.10" A contractual agreement helps
demonstrate compliance with G.S. 158-7.2's mandate for local
governments to approve and account for the funds turned over.101
Third, all contracts entered into by municipalities, whether related to
economic development or not, "shall be in writing." 0 2 Fourth-
perhaps the most obvious reason-agreements provide a means of
monitoring a company's performance and enforcing remedies for
failure to perform.
G.S. 158-7.1(h) requires that "[elach economic development
agreement entered into between a private enterprise and a city or
county . .. clearly state their respective responsibilities under the
agreement." 03 Additionally, "[e]ach agreement shall contain
provisions regarding remedies for a breach . . . on the part of the
private enterprise."'" These remedies "shall include a provision
requiring the recapture of sums appropriated . .. by the city or county
upon the occurrence of events specified in the agreement." 0o This is
fairly straightforward language that explicitly requires recapture
provisions for events specified in the agreement. This begs the
question: What "events" are to be "specified" for recapture in each
agreement? The answer is found in a sentence that lists three events
using the conjunction "and":
99. See § 158-7.1(d2)(2) ("The governing board of the county or city shall
contractually bind the purchaser of the property . . . .").
100. Id. § 158-7.2; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (detailing the
history and requirements of G.S. 158-7.2).
101. See § 158-7.2.
102. Id. § 160A-16. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has interpreted the pre-audit
certificate requirement of G.S. 159-28(a) as implicitly mandating that all contracts by local
governments-counties included-must be in writing in order to be valid. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Cnty. of Durham, No. COA12-1484, 2013 WL 1878933, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App.
May 7, 2013); Exec. Med. Transp., Inc. v. Jones Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., - N.C. App. -,
, 735 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2012), disc. rev. denied, _ N.C. _, 737 S.E.2d 378 (2013); see also
Kara Millonzi, Court of Appeals Reaffirms New Interpretation of Pre-Audit Requirement,
COATES' CANONS: N.C. Loc. GOV'T L. BLOG (May 23, 2013, 5:39 PM),
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Events that would require the city or county to recapture funds
would include [1] the creation of fewer jobs than specified in
the agreement, [2] a lower capital investment than specified in
the agreement, and [3] failing to maintain operations at a
specified level for a period of time specified in the agreement.106
Note that the listed events "would require" recapture of funds.
The use of the word "would," the primary definition of which is the
past tense of "will,"107 in "would require . . . would include"' is most
plausibly read as indicating futurity-that is, if the listed events occur
in the future, the agreement will require recapture. At first glance,
one might be tempted to suggest that the use of "would" indicates
that the three listed events are offered merely as helpful suggestions
to be included in an agreement at a local government's option. Such a
formulation can be reduced to this: If the listed recapture events are
inserted in the agreement, then the agreement will require recapture
upon the occurrence of those events. Upon closer examination,
however, it becomes clear that this formulation is absurd. It is
tautological to state that recapture events listed in an agreement will
require recapture when those events occur-that is the very definition
of recapture events.10 Under this interpretation, the North Carolina
General Assembly could have omitted the final sentence of G.S. 158-
7.1(h) entirely and the statute's meaning would remain the same.
Furthermore, subsection (h) would be reduced to irrelevance,
consisting of little more than advice that (1) economic development
agreements should "clearly state [the parties'] respective
responsibilities under the agreement" and provide for "remedies for a
breach of those responsibilities"' (tautological statements that are
applicable to all agreements), and (2) should an agreement happen to
list recapture events, the occurrence of the events will lead to
recapture."' Such an interpretation is not only tautological but also
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1640 (2d
ed. 1980) (defining "would" primarily as the past tense of "will" and secondarily as "an
auxiliary used: (a) to express condition ... [and] (b) in indirect discourse to express
futurity").
108. § 158-7.1(h).
109. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recapture as "[t]he
lawful taking by the government of earnings or profits exceeding a specified amount; esp.,
the government's recovery of a tax benefit (such as a deduction or credit) by taxing
income or property that no longer qualifies for the benefit").
110. § 158-7.1(h).
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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violates principles of statutory construction. 12 Specifically, a "cardinal
principle of statutory construction"113 is that each word in a statute
must be given meaning.1 14 Adoption of the tautological interpretation,
which arguably renders subsection (h) virtually meaningless, would
violate that "cardinal principle,""t particularly since the North
Carolina General Assembly knows how to create illustrative, non-
binding lists." 6 Accordingly, the most plausible interpretation of this
clause, consistent with principles of statutory construction, is that the
three recapture events listed in subsection (h)-the creation of fewer
jobs than promised, lower capital investment than promised, and
failing to maintain operations as promised-are to appear in every
incentive agreement such that if those events occur, the agreement will
provide for recapture.
The three "events" that trigger recapture-job creation, capital
investment, and maintaining operations-can be boiled down to two
essential elements: creating jobs and making a capital investment that
increases the tax base. The recapture provision regarding "failing to
112. See Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 336 N.C. 142, 154, 731 S.E.2d 800,
809-10 (2012) (noting that "[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite
meaning" (internal quotation marks omitted)). If a court were to assume, in arguendo,
that a possible interpretation of the oddly worded sentence in subsection (h) is the
tautological interpretation described above, then there would be at least two possible
interpretations of subsection (h): one in which all three listed events are required in each
incentive agreement, and another in which the three listed events are merely suggested as
options (the tautological result). With two possible meanings, the plain meaning rule
espoused in Lanvale is clearly inapplicable for interpreting G.S. 158-7.1(h), and rules of
statutory construction must be employed.
113. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of
statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.... We are reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. See Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) ("[Courts should] give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the
language it employed."). Courts will avoid interpretations that render words irrelevant or
superfluous. See TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31; Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem,
302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981) ("It is well established that a statute must be
considered as a whole and construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be
rendered useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to
be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage.").
115. See TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31.
116. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-458.3(a) (2011) ("By way of illustration but not
limitation, such a project might include a single building comprising a publicly owned
parking structure and publicly owned convention center and a privately owned hotel or
office building."); id. § 158-7.1(b) ("This listing is not intended to limit by implication or
otherwise the grant of authority set out in subsection (a) of this section.").
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maintain operations at a specified level for a period of time""m is
better understood as complementing the provisions regarding job
creation and capital investment. After all, without a recapture
provision specifying how long a company must maintain its
operations, a company could make a capital investment and create
jobs to obtain an incentive, but thereafter fire its employees, remove
its equipment, and shutter its facility. Thus, subsection (h) ensures
that all economic development agreements specify how long a
company must retain jobs and capital investment to avoid
recapture."'
C. Summary of Section 158-7.1 Requirements for Economic
Development Incentives
The key provisions of G.S. 158-7.1 can be reorganized along the
three dimensions of this Article's proposed framework for analyzing
incentives: means, consideration, and procedural requirements. Each
dimension is addressed in turn.
1. Allowable Means for Incentives in the Statute
G.S. 158-7.1 places almost no limitations on the means for
undertaking economic development incentives. Subsection (b)
contains a listing of permissible means involving land and facilities,
but that listing is "not intended to limit by implication or otherwise
the grant of authority set out in [S]ubsection (a),"119 which is a
virtually boundless catch-all provision.12 0 Perhaps the only statutory
limitation on allowable means is that a city may acquire property for
resale outside of city limits, but only within counties in which the city
is located, provided the property will be used by a business that will
provide jobs to city residents.'21
Although G.S. 158-7.1 does not impose significant limitations on
means, there are a few restrictions found elsewhere in the law. For
example, it is not permissible for a local government to reduce or
117. Id. § 158-7.1(h).
118. See id.
119. Id. § 158-7.1(b).
120. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the catch-all provision of G.S. 158-7.1(a)).
121. See § 158-7.1(b)(2). This particular limitation does not appear to apply to
acquisitions under subsections (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4), but a conservative approach
would respect the limitation in all instances. Even this limitation can ultimately be
overcome, as a cooperative arrangement with another local government could be used to
acquire property outside of city limits. See id. § 158-7.4(a).
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121modify the property tax rate for an individual company.
Additionally, tax refunds and rebates are prohibited by statute.123
Utility law imposes limitations as well: Local governments cannot
offer reduced utility rates to a company as part of an economic
development incentive package because comparable customers
receiving comparable services cannot be placed in different rate
classes. 124 However, as a practical matter, these various prohibitions
are not difficult to work around. While explicitly providing individual
utility and tax rate adjustments is not permitted, the broad authority
to make appropriations for economic development under subsection
(a) allows a local government to accomplish the same ends by paying
reimbursements out of its general fund to offset a company's property
tax payments125 or utility costs.126
Accordingly, most of the limitations found in G.S. 158-7.1 pertain
not to the means of undertaking economic development activities, but
rather to the consideration expected in return for an incentive and the
procedural requirements related to approval of incentives. Those
limitations are discussed in greater detail below.
122. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(2)-(3) (providing that only the North Carolina
General Assembly may classify or exempt property for property tax purposes, and such
classification must apply on a statewide basis). Another means prohibited by the North
Carolina Constitution is a loan guarantee. See id. § 4(3) (prohibiting any local government
from "giv[ing] or lend[ing] its credit in aid of any person, association, or corporation,"
except for public purposes and with the approval of the voters). A loan of credit occurs
whenever a local government guarantees the debts of another. See id. § 4(5).
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-380(a) (2011).
124. See, e.g., In re Lower Cape Fear Water & Sewer Auth., 329 N.C. 675, 677, 407
S.E.2d 155, 157 (1991) (noting that the Lower Cape Fear Water and Sewer Authority "is
subject to the common law rule that it cannot charge rates that would constitute an
unwarranted discrimination among the parties it was formed to serve"); see also Kara A.
Millonzi, Using Utility Rates as an Economic Development Incentive Tool, COMMUNITY &
ECON. DEV. IN N.C. & BEYOND (Aug. 31, 2010), http://ced.sog.unc.edu/?p=2042
[hereinafter Millonzi, Using Utility Rates] (describing limitations on using utility rates as
an economic development incentive); Kara A. Millonzi, Lawful Discrimination in Utility
Ratemaking, 33 LOC. FIN. BULL., Oct. 2006, at 3, available at
http://sogpubs.unc.edu//electronicversions/pdfs/fb33.pdf ("Cities must charge rates, rents,
fees, and charges that are (1) reasonably related to the value of the services either actually
consumed or readily available for consumption (the reasonableness principle) and (2)
roughly equal for similarly situated groups of consumers (the nondiscrimination
principle).").
125. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 14 (explaining how some local government
incentive policies "approach tax abatements in effect").
126. See Millonzi, Using Utility Rates, supra note 124. Indeed, Maready involved, in
part, reimbursements for utility connections. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342
N.C. 708, 736, 467 S.E.2d 615, 632 (1996). Also, the incentives paid in Haugh and Blinson
were calculated to offset a portion of property taxes to be paid by the companies. See
Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816 (2010); Blinson v.
State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 332, 651 S.E.2d 268, 273 (2007).
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2. Consideration Required by Statute in Exchange for Incentives
While G.S. 158-7.1 has little to say regarding allowable means for
incentives, it offers a fair amount of guidance about the consideration
to be received from a company in exchange for an incentive,
particularly when the incentive involves conveyance of land and
facilities or a written economic development agreement.127
In the case of the conveyance of land and facilities, the statute
assumes that jobs will result from such transactions, even when a
company receives no direct monetary subsidy. For example, when a
local government uses its grant of power under G.S. 158-7.1 to sell
property to a business for fair market value at a private sale-the
benefit to the business being the avoidance of competitive bidding
processes that might bid up the price or allow another entity to outbid
the business entirely-the statute assumes that jobs will be created as
a result.' As part of approving such a sale, the governing board must
"determine the probable average hourly wage to be paid to workers
by the business to be located at the property."129
When the conveyance of property involves providing a subsidy to
a business through a conveyance for less than fair market value, the
consideration required is considerably more substantial. Jobs and tax
base are among the required forms of consideration. First, the
property conveyance must "result in the creation of a substantial
number of jobs" that pay a wage matching or exceeding the average
wage in the county. 30 Second, the governing board must
"contractually bind" the business to construct improvements that will
generate tax revenue to allow the local government to recoup its
subsidy within ten years.'
Jobs and increased tax base are also the expected forms of
consideration whenever a local government enters into an economic
development agreement with a private enterprise. Each such
agreement "shall include a provision requiring the recapture of sums
appropriated" for "the creation of fewer jobs than specified in the
127. See § 158-7.1(d) (2011) ("The consideration for the conveyance may not be less
than the [fair market] value...."); id. § 158-7.1(d2); id. § 158-7.1(h). Additionally, the
statute allows for the governing board to account for prospective tax revenues when
determining the total consideration to be paid. See id. § 158-7.1(d2).
128. See id. § 158-7.1(d); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting an
instance where the statute appears to assume that conveyance will result in job creation).
129. § 158-7.1(d).
130. Id. § 158-7.1(d2)(1).
131. Id. § 158-7.1(d2)(2); see also supra Part I.B.4 (discussing special accounting




agreement."132 Additionally, appropriated funds shall be recaptured
in the event a business makes "a lower capital investment than
specified."133 The company must also promise to maintain its
operations for a specified period of time, in essence ensuring that its
promise of job creation and increasing the tax base will be sustained
over time. 34
3. Procedural Requirements by Statute for Approval of Incentives
As mentioned, there are no procedural requirements associated
with the general grant of authority provided in the catch-all provision,
subsection (a)."' However, for activities involving land and facilities
under subsection (b), the statute imposes a series of procedural
requirements set forth in subsections (c) and (d)-even when no
subsidy is provided to a business-including mandatory notice
provisions, public hearings, and, in the case of a conveyance of
property, findings regarding the fair market value of the property and
the probable wage to be paid to workers at the property.13 6
When a conveyance of property involves providing a subsidy to a
business based upon the expectation of future local government
revenues under subsection (d2), the procedural requirements are
more demanding. In addition to the subsection (d) notice and public
hearing required for the conveyance, the governing board must also
make a formal determination that the conveyance will "stimulate the
local economy, promote business, and result in the creation of a
substantial number of jobs" paying at or above the average county
wage."' Additionally, the local government must enter into an
132. § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (explaining the recapture provisions
required in incentive agreements and proposing the most plausible construction for the
statute).
133. § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (examining statutorily-required recapture
provisions pertaining to capital investment).
134. See § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (examining statutorily-required
recapture provisions to be applied in the event a business fails to maintain its operations
over time).
135. See supra Part I.B.1. Appropriations made pursuant to subsection (a) are subject
to no explicit procedural requirements other than the oversight requirements of G.S. 158-
7.2. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
136. See § 158-7.1(b)-(d); see also supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the procedural
requirements for appropriations authorized by G.S. 158-7.1(b) and unsubsidized
conveyances of property under G.S. 158-7.1(c) and (d)).
137. § 158-7.1(d2)(1); see also supra Part I.B.4 (considering the procedural
requirements for subsidized conveyances of property by local governments).
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agreement that contractually binds the purchaser to construct
improvements that will recoup the up-front subsidy.'38
Outside of the subsidized conveyance scenario just described,
G.S. 158-7.1 does not require a local government to enter into an
economic development incentive agreement. However, memorializing
incentives in a written agreement is a common practice' 9 that is
probably necessary in order to comply with other statutes-e.g., G.S.
158-7.2, which requires local governments to exercise oversight of
appropriations to other entities,140 G.S. 160A-16, which requires
municipal contracts to be in writing,'4 1 and G.S. 159-28(a), which
requires a pre-audit certificate for contracts. 142
II. MAREADY AND ITS PROGENY ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
INCENTIVES UNDER SECTION 158-7.1
An understanding of the authority conferred by G.S. 158-7.1 to
local governments and the requirements imposed by the statute on
incentive transactions is merely the starting point of our inquiry. Even
when a statute appears to grant broad authority, courts have the final
say on whether the activities undertaken pursuant to the statute are
constitutional. 143 As an example of a constitutional-rather than
statutory-limitation in the economic development area, a threshold
question posed to courts for decades was whether the public purpose
doctrine of the North Carolina Constitution'" allowed disbursement
of funds to a private entity as a constitutional means of undertaking
138. See § 158-7.1(d2)(1); see also supra Part I.B.4 (noting how local governments must
recoup the upfront subsidy within ten years).
139. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619
(1996) (stating that the "typical procedures" observed for the incentives at issue include
administering the incentives "pursuant to a written contract"); see also supra note 97
(describing survey results indicating that a majority of respondent local governments
require a written agreement for incentive transactions).
140. See § 158-7.2; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (describing the
oversight requirements of G.S. 158-7.2 for economic development expenditures).
141. See § 160A-16.
142. See id. § 159-28(a); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing
requirements for contracts to be made in writing).
143. See, e.g., Maready, 342 N.C. at 716, 467 S.E.2d at 620 ("[U]ltimate responsibility
for the [constitutional] public purpose determination rests with this Court.").
144. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just
and equitable manner, for public purposes only .... " (emphasis added)); id. § 2(7) ("[T]he
State, any county, city or town, and any other public corporation may contract with and
appropriate money to any person, association, or corporation for the accomplishment of
public purposes only." (emphasis added)).
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economic development.145 Enacted in 1967, the Industrial
Development Financing Act authorized the issuance of industrial
revenue bonds to equip private facilities;1" however, at the time those
means were prohibited under the public purpose doctrine. 147 The
means question was ultimately settled in 1973 by the addition of
Article V, § 2(7) to the North Carolina Constitution,148 specifically
allowing direct appropriation to private entities for public purposes.'
Today, incentives often take the form of direct cash disbursements to
companies,15 0 and the form of incentive (or the means used) is no
longer a controversial issue."1
145. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 720, 467 S.E.2d at 623 (noting that the "focal concern" in
earlier cases had been "the means used to achieve economic growth"); see also
LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 3-5 (discussing the public purpose limitation, generally,
against the background leading to Maready).
146. See North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Act, ch. 535, § 14, 1967
N.C. Sess. Laws 567, 576 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 123A (1967) and repealed by Act
of July 11, 1983, ch. 717, § 39, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 735, 738) ("The [North Carolina
Industrial Development Financing Authority] is hereby authorized to provide for the
issuance, at one time or from time to time, of industrial revenue bonds of the authority for
the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost of any project or projects.").
147. See Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159, 159 S.E.2d 745, 760
(1968) ("If public purpose is now to include State or municipal ownership and operation of
the means of production-even on an interim basis ... the people themselves must so
declare."); see also Maready, 342 N.C. at 719, 467 S.E.2d at 622 ("As in Mitchell, the
[Stanley] Court repeatedly asserted that direct assistance to a private concern by the use of
tax-exempt revenue-bond financing could not be the means used to effect a public
purpose."); Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 41, 199 S.E.2d 641, 658
(1973) ("Since the State may not directly aid a private industry by the exemption of its
bonds for plant construction from taxation, it may not indirectly accomplish the same
purpose by authorizing the creation of an authority to issue its tax-exempt revenue bonds
for that same purpose.").
148. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(7) ("The General Assembly may enact laws whereby
the State, any county, city or town, and any other public corporation may contract with
and appropriate money to any person, association, or corporation for the accomplishment
of public purposes only."); Maready, 342 N.C. at 720, 467 S.E.2d at 623 ("Moreover, the
Court's focal concern in Mitchell and Stanley, the means used to achieve economic growth,
has also been removed by constitutional amendment. In 1973 Article V, § 2(7) was added
to the North Carolina Constitution, specifically allowing direct appropriation to private
entities for public purposes.... [U]nder subsection (7) direct disbursement of public funds
to private entities is a constitutionally permissible means of accomplishing a public
purpose provided there is statutory authority to make such appropriation." (emphasis in
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
149. See Act of July 1, 1973, ch. 1200, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1385,1385.
150. See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 5 (reporting that a 2006 survey of North Carolina
local governments indicated that 41.5% of respondent local governments used cash grant
incentives for business recruitment and 29% used them for business retention and
expansion).
151. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (opining that "even the most
innovative activities" permitted by G.S. 158-7.1 are constitutional "so long as they
primarily benefit the public and not a private party").
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With the means question now largely settled, this Article simply
assumes that incentives take the form of direct cash payments to a
company. A local government certainly is not required to make cash
payments to induce a company to locate or expand in its
jurisdiction-the government could just as well provide in-kind
assistance, provide training to company employees, or come up with
some other incentive. The form of the incentive granted from the
local government to the company is not important-the important
issue is what public benefit the local government extracts in return.15 2
Thus, the inquiry now turns to whether economic development
incentives, by inducing corporations to locate in North Carolina,
regardless of their form, serve a public purpose. This was the focus of
the Maready decision and its appellate court progeny, Blinson and
Haugh. The controversy in those cases addressed two related
constitutional concepts: exclusive emoluments and public purpose.
A. Exclusive Emoluments Clause and Consideration for Incentives
The Exclusive Emoluments Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution establishes that "[n]o person or set of persons is entitled
to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community but in consideration of public services."" Consideration,
as that term is used in contract law, is something of value given by
each party to a contract that makes the contract enforceable.'54 Thus,
no emolument, or payment, may be made unless proper consideration
in the form of public services is provided in return. Past performance
is not sufficient consideration.ss Gifts of public money or assets are
constitutionally prohibited."'
152. See id.
153. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32 (emphasis added).
154. See Stonestreet v. S. Oil Co., 226 N.C. 261, 262-63, 37 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1946) ("It
may be stated as a general rule that 'consideration' in the sense the term is used in legal
parlance, as affecting the enforceability of simple contracts, consists of some benefit or
advantage to the promisor, or of some loss or detriment to the promisee. It has been held
that 'there is a consideration if the promisee, in return for the promise, does anything legal
which he is not bound to do, or refrains from doing anything which he has a right to do,
whether there is any actual loss or detriment to him or actual benefit to the promisor or
not.' On the other hand, a mere promise, without more, lacks a consideration and is
unenforceable." (citations omitted)).
155. See Critcher v. Watson, 146 N.C. 150, 151, 59 S.E. 544, 545 (1907) ("[A]n executed
or past consideration is no consideration to support an express promise .... "); see also
Estate of Graham v. Morrison, 168 N.C. App. 63, 70, 607 S.E.2d 295, 300 (2005) ("Past
consideration or moral obligation is not adequate consideration to support a contract.").
Past consideration has been held insufficient under the Exclusive Emoluments Clause in
the context of severance payments to public employees that were not negotiated at the
outset of the employment relationship. See Leete v. Cnty. of Warren, 341 N.C. 116, 122-
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Applying these concepts to economic development incentives, a
business may be provided an incentive only when valid consideration
is received in exchange.' 7 An example where consideration would be
absent is a company seeking incentives to locate in a local
government's jurisdiction after the company has already committed
to locate there. Following such a commitment, the local government
cannot accept the company's promise to locate in the jurisdiction as
valid consideration for an incentive payment, because the company
has already committed to locate in the jurisdiction. Such an incentive
would amount to a constitutionally impermissible gift: the
constitution does not allow the government to pay an entity to do
something that the entity has already committed to do.' 8
23, 462 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1995) ("At the time Mr. Worth was appointed to his position, the
Board entered no agreement with Mr. Worth for severance pay in the event he voluntarily
relinquished his position. In fact, Mr. Worth had no written employment contract with
Warren County. Because there was no written contract providing for severance pay or
additional compensation beyond his salary for services rendered, the 'severance pay'
which Mr. Worth seeks is no more than a request for a gratuity, which the Board had no
authority to pay. Any additional compensation to Mr. Worth would be without
consideration and represents a claim which Mr. Worth could not enforce either in law or
in equity.... Thus, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that the proposed
payment of $5,073.12 to Mr. Worth upon his resignation does violate Article I, Section 32
of the North Carolina Constitution."). The generally accepted rule in contract law is that
past consideration is insufficient to support a promise. See, e.g., Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc.,
306 F.3d 1003, 1012 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Utah law, which says, "[g]enerally, past
services cannot serve as consideration for a subsequent promise"); Smith v. Recrion Corp.,
541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975) ("Past consideration is the legal equivalent to no
consideration."); see also 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 9.1, at 239
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1996) ("Happenings of the past, not bargained for by a promisor,
are far less likely to be held to make an informal promise enforceable than are those for
which the promisor bargains. Not infrequently, however, such happenings induce the
making of subsequent promises. In such cases they are commonly described as 'past
consideration' for the promise.").
156. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32; see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 89 (2d ed. 2000) ("[The] Privileges and
Emoluments Clause prohibits the state or any local government from making a gift of
money or other public assets." (citing Redevelopment Comm'n v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 252
N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960))).
157. See, e.g., In re Okla. Dev. Fin. Auth., 89 P.3d 1075, 1082-83 (Okla. 2004) (finding
that "the benefits to be derived from economic development constitute adequate
consideration to defeat assertions that economic incentives are in the nature of a 'gift,' "
provided the government obtains "adequate consideration and accountability from [the]
private actor in exchange for the expenditure of public funds").
158. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 55-56 ("Thus the promise from the company is
the consideration that supports the incentive, both constitutionally and contractually. If
the company cannot offer the local government some consideration of [jobs and tax base],
the incentive becomes a mere gift of public assets, with the public receiving nothing in
return for its expenditure.").
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The need for a local government to receive valid consideration
from a company in exchange for an incentive is sometimes expressed
through a necessity or "but-for" determination: That is, "but for" the
incentive payment to a company, the company would not locate its
facility and jobs in the jurisdiction. 5 9 Indeed, the incentives approved
in Maready contained a "but-for" or necessity determination as part
of the local government's approval process. As the court noted, prior
to approval, "[a] determination is made that participation by local
government is necessary to cause a project to go forward in the
community."'60
Even when an incentive passes the "but-for" test, it still may be
challenged as being an "exclusive emolument" benefiting a specific
person or group of persons rather than the public generally.61
However, case law has established that activities that serve a public
purpose are necessarily "not an exclusive emolument."162 Thus, for an
incentive that satisfies the "but-for" requirement, the exclusive
emoluments question may be resolved by determining whether the
incentive serves a public purpose.
159. The term "but for" is most commonly used in tort law. See Ratliff v. Duke Power
Co., 268 N.C. 605, 614, 151 S.E.2d 641, 648 (1966) (explaining that "[a]n event which is a
'but for' cause of another event [is] a cause without which the second event would not
have taken place").
160. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996).
These "but-for" or necessity determinations also appear in the discretionary economic
development incentive programs administered by the State. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143B-437.52(a)(4) (2011) (requiring that any grant issued through the Job Development
Investment Grant program be "necessary for the completion of the project in this State");
id. § 143B-437.02(h)(5)(F) (requiring that site development performed using funds from
the Site Infrastructure Development Fund be "necessary for the completion of the project
in this State"). Likewise, "but-for" determinations appear in guidelines established by
executive agencies of the State. See, e.g., N.C. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES AND
PROCEDURES FOR COMMITMENT OF FUNDS FROM THE ONE NORTH CAROLINA FUND
§ 6.1 (2004), available at http://www.thrivenc.com/node/985/one-north-carolina-fund-
guidelines (establishing the "Threshold Statutory Criteria for Awarding Funds" in Section
6.1 as being "used in connection with projects for which participation by the state
government is needed for the project to go forward or be undertaken in the state").
161. Classifications or exemptions in favor of a specific group of persons will survive a
challenge under the exclusive emoluments clause if "(1) the exemption is intended to
promote the general welfare rather than the benefit of the individual, and (2) there is a
reasonable basis for the legislature to conclude the granting of the exemption serves the
public interest." Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 342, 651 S.E.2d 268, 278 (2007)
(quoting Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 654, 360 S.E.2d 756, 764 (1987)).
162. Id. ("[W]hen legislation is determined to 'promote the public benefit' under the
Public Purpose Clauses, it necessarily is not an exclusive emolument.").
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B. Public Purpose
The North Carolina Constitution provides that the "power of
taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public
purposes only." 16 3 A public purpose is required not only for the
original levy of taxes, but also for the expenditure of collected
funds." Furthermore, Article V, § 2(7) provides that governments
may, pursuant to statute, "contract with and appropriate money to
any person, association, or corporation for the accomplishment of
public purposes only."'6
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has articulated a two-
prong test for public purpose. In Madison Cablevision v. City of
Morganton,6 6 the court stated:
Two guiding principles have been established for determining
that a particular undertaking by a municipality is for a public
purpose: (1) it involves a reasonable connection with the
convenience and necessity of the particular municipality; and
(2) the activity benefits the public generally, as opposed to
special interests or persons.167
The Maready court applied the two-pronged Madison
Cablevision test in evaluating the public purpose of economic
development incentives pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1.16 The court
dispensed with the first prong by making two points. First, the court
recited Supreme Court of North Carolina precedent in support of the
proposition that economic development has "long been recognized as
a proper governmental function."l 69 Second, the court observed that
activities authorized by G.S. 158-7.1 "invoke traditional governmental
powers and authorities in the service of economic development."1 0
The court declared that activities authorized by subsection (b) of G.S.
163. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) (emphasis added).
164. See Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 143, 159 S.E.2d 745,
749-50 (1968) ("The power to appropriate money from the public treasury is no greater
than the power to levy the tax which put the money in the treasury. Both powers are
subject to the constitutional proscription that tax revenues may not be used for private
individuals or corporations, no matter how benevolent.").
165. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(7) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 143-50 and
accompanying text (discussing constitutionally permissible means used to achieve
economic growth).
166. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
167. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207.
168. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 722-24, 467 S.E.2d 615, 624-
25 (1996).
169. Id. at 723, 467 S.E.2d at 624.
170. Id. at 723-24, 467 S.E.2d at 624.
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158-7.1, such as the improvement and conveyance of land in industrial
parks and the provision of utility extensions, were analogous to
activities such as land acquisition, slum clearance, and sale of land to
private developers, authorized by the Urban Redevelopment Law."'
Note that the court referred to the activities authorized by subsection
(b) of G.S. 158-7.1. This is one indication, among others, that the
specific activities described in subsection (b) (and the associated
procedural requirements) figured heavily in the Maready opinion, a
point that will be revisited later in this Part.172
With the first prong resolved in favor of economic development
incentives, the court turned to the second prong: whether "the activity
benefits the public generally, as opposed to special interests or
persons.""' In assessing G.S. 158-7.1, the court found that the statute
serves a public purpose as a general matter and stated that
"[g]enerally, if an act will promote the welfare of a state or a local
government and its citizens, it is for a public purpose. Viewed in this
light, G.S. 158-7.1 clearly serves a public purpose."174
Although the court established that G.S. 158-7.1 serves a public
purpose as a general matter,175 that does not mean that all activities
permitted by G.S. 158-7.1 are constitutional. The Maready court
found that "even the most innovative activities" permitted by G.S.
158-7.1 are constitutional "so long as they primarily benefit the public
and not a private party."17  In other words, incentives are
constitutional provided they obtain a net public benefit. The court
explained that, to ensure this "net public benefit," incentive
expenditures "should create a more stable local economy by
providing displaced workers with continuing employment
opportunities, attracting better paying and more highly skilled jobs,
enlarging the tax base, and diversifying the economy.""' This is the
171. See id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
172. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
173. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 646, 386 S.E.2d 200,
207 (1989).
174. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
175. See id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. The court of appeals reiterated this test in Haugh: "With respect to the second
prong of the Madison Cablevision test, as noted in Maready, expenditures 'should create a
more stable local economy by providing displaced workers with continuing employment
opportunities, attracting better paying and more highly skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base,
and diversifying the economy.' " Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702
S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010) (citing Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625); see also Saine
v. State, 210 N.C. App. 594, 604, 709 S.E.2d 379, 387 (2011) ("In Maready, our Supreme
Court held that, '[t]he expenditures [the statute at issue] authorizes should create a more
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clearest articulation of the factors that contribute to a net public
benefit-jobs, increasing the tax base, and diversifying the
economy-so these factors will be explored further in Part II.B.1.
Beyond the aforementioned factors, the incentives approved in
Maready serve as concrete examples of incentives that contain the
necessary net public benefit and now set the standard by which other
incentives are judged."' All local government incentives litigated to
date at the appellate level have been indistinguishable from those at
issue in Maready, leaving the reviewing court bound by precedent to
uphold them.7 9 The incentives at issue in Maready will therefore be
studied in Part II.B.2 to determine their key characteristics-
characteristics that, when emulated, will be upheld as "parallel" to the
Maready incentives.o
Accordingly, the remainder of this Part II.B will be devoted to
exploring the two strands of analysis described above: (1) the factors
contributing to a net public benefit, and (2) the distinctive
characteristics of the incentives in Maready that can be emulated in
order to remain safely within the confines of Maready's public
purpose analysis. The factors thus identified will be incorporated into
this Article's proposed framework for analyzing economic
development incentives.
1. Maready's Net Public Benefit Factors
In explaining the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test,
the Maready court stated that "even the most innovative activities"
permitted by G.S. 158-7.1 are constitutional "so long as they primarily
benefit the public and not a private party.""s' Thus, while a local
stable local economy by providing displaced workers with continuing employment
opportunities, attracting better paying and more highly skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base,
and diversifying the economy.' "(citing Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625)).
178. The analysis in Maready, however, may not be the last word regarding the public
purpose of incentives. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has explicitly declined to
establish a permanent "slide-rule" definition of public purpose "for all time." See
Maready, 342 N.C. at 716, 467 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth.,
273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968)).
179. See, e.g., Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 319, 702 S.E.2d at 824 ("Incentives parallel to
those at issue already have been held to comport to the Public Purpose Clauses of our
State Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison Cablevision, and we are
bound by that precedent."); Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276
(2007) ("In the absence of a showing of some distinction between the incentives in this
case and the incentives in the Maready case, we hold that the trial court properly
concluded that the County and City Resolutions and the Agreement did not violate the
Public Purpose Clauses.").
180. See Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 319, 702 S.E.2d at 825.
181. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
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government is permitted to experiment with various means of
promoting economic development, each incentive must nonetheless
primarily benefit the public. How should local governments assess
whether an incentive provides sufficient public benefit?
One might attempt to use the language of the catch-all provision,
subsection (a), as a statutory public purpose test. Subsection (a)
authorizes local governments to make appropriations that "increase
the population, taxable property, agricultural industries and business
prospects of any city or county." 82 However, the Maready court
dismissed this language as merely aspirational-the statute's "self-
proclaimed end"-and instead articulated a different set of
"consequences" or factors that "ensure a net public benefit."' The
court stated that economic development expenditures "should create
a more stable local economy by providing displaced workers with
continuing employment opportunities, attracting better paying and
more highly skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base, and diversifying the
economy."'
Those four factors contributing to a net public benefit-
providing displaced workers with employment opportunities,
attracting better paying jobs, enlarging the tax base, and diversifying
the economy-are more commonly boiled down to two: jobs and tax
base. The Maready majority engaged in this reduction when
explaining that "[G.S.] 158-7.1, which is intended to alleviate
conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress and to increase the
local tax base, serves the public interest."8 5 The majority also
emphasized the importance of jobs and tax base in a different way:
New and expanded industries in communities within North
Carolina provide work and economic opportunity for those who
otherwise might not have it. This, in turn, creates a broader tax
base from which the State and its local governments can draw
funding for other programs that benefit the general health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.'86
Interestingly, it is the dissent in Maready that offered the most
succinct articulation of these factors, characterizing the majority's
holding-no less than eight times without any rebuttal from the
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(a) (2011).
183. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
186. Id. (emphasis added); see also Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 337, 651 S.E.2d
268, 276 (2007) (quoting this language from Maready).
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majority-as standing for the proposition that "simply creating new
jobs and increasing the tax base is a public purpose.""
The emphasis on jobs and tax base can even be seen in the way
the court described the facts of the case. In describing the incentives
at issue, the court noted that "officials estimate an increase in the local
tax base of $238,593,000 and a projected creation of over 5,500 new
jobs as a result of these economic development incentive
programs."' 8 The North Carolina Court of Appeals likewise felt it
necessary to describe the jobs and tax base to be generated by the
incentives before it. In describing the public benefits expected from
the contested incentives in Blinson, the court recounted benefits such
as "substantial number of jobs at competitive wages," capital
investment with "aggregate taxable value of at least $100 million," and
creation of "at least 1,700 local Qualified jobs."' Indeed, the court in
Blinson went so far as to suggest that the plaintiffs would have
needed to raise a question about job creation and increasing the tax
base in order to state a proper claim for relief.'90 In Haugh, the
incentives were paid in exchange for "a new investment of Twenty-
Four Million Dollars ($24,000,000.00), hiring two hundred ten (210)
new employees and adding a minimum of Five Million Dollars
($5,000,000.00) in additional business personal property tax listings."
Thus, job creation and increasing the tax base remain at the forefront
in determining the public benefit of incentives. 92
187. Maready, 342 N.C. at 734-37, 742, 467 S.E.2d at 631-33, 636 (Orr, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina will not shrink from addressing a
mischaracterization or flaw in a dissenting opinion. See, e.g., Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty.
of Cabarrus, 336 N.C. 142, 155-56, 731 S.E.2d 800, 810 (2012). However, the majority in
Maready made no attempt to correct or modify the dissent's characterization of its
holding.
188. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added).
189. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 332, 651 S.E.2d at 272-73 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 341, 651 S.E.2d at 278 ("Plaintiffs' complaint contains no allegations
suggesting that the legislative bodies were not acting with a motivation to increase the tax
base or alleviate unemployment and fiscal distress.").
191. Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816 (2010)
(emphasis added).
192. In evaluating the public purpose of legislation, courts will not "engage in economic
projections as to the potential monetary benefits resulting from the legislation. The latter
analyses are for the General Assembly and the Executive Branch, which can also take into
account non-monetary benefits." Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 341, 651 S.E.2d at 278
(emphasis added). While the courts will not engage in such an evaluation of legislation,
they are not prevented from evaluating the public benefits generated by an incentive in a
particular case, as they have done in G.S. 158-7.1 incentive cases since Maready. See, e.g.,
Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 318-19, 702 S.E.2d at 824.
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"Diversifying the economy," the last of the four factors listed as
ensuring a net public benefit, complements the two essential factors,
jobs and tax base.'93 This final factor suggests that not all jobs and not
all capital investment qualify as creating a public benefit; rather, the
jobs and investment must improve and diversify the economic base of
the community. Without more explanation from North Carolina
courts, it is difficult to sketch the boundaries of this last factor. Some
clues can be gleaned from cases in other states that were cited in
Maready to support the opinion's public purpose analysis.194 Among
those cases that specify how diversification of the economy results
from an economic development expenditure, most refer to attracting
industrial facilities or to improving the health of entire industrial
sectors, such as: "development of new kinds of products,
technologies, and projects, which ordinarily do not attract
conventional forms of financing;"19 5 "direct and indirect benefits to
the state aviation system;"196 "a highly sophisticated automobile
manufacturing complex";'" and "operations ... requir[ing] many
employees; and ... facilities for ship repair [making the city] more
attractive to seaborne commerce." 98 We can, therefore, speculate
that an altogether new industry, such as a manufacturing facility for a
product that was not already produced locally, would be viewed as
diversifying the local economy; arguably, so would the addition of a
new facility that contributed to an existing and growing industry
cluster.19 9 Types of development that do not fit comfortably with the
193. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625; see also Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at
332, 651 S.E.2d at 273 (listing "economic diversification and stimulus and training in
technology, computer assembly and manufacturing skills" among the benefits accruing
from the incentives at issue (emphasis added)).
194. Maready, 342 N.C. at 725 & n.1, 467 S.E.2d at 626 & n.1.
195. Wilson v. Conn. Prod. Dev. Corp., 355 A.2d 72, 76 (Conn. 1974).
196. In re Interrogatory Propounded by Gov. Roy Romer on House Bill 91S-1005, 814
P.2d 875, 884 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
197. Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 803-04 (Ky. 1987).
198. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 26 (Me. 1983).
199. See Jonathan Q. Morgan, Clusters and Competitive Advantage: Finding a Niche in
the New Economy, 69 POPULAR Gov'T 43, 46 (2004) ("The location of a critical mass of
firms close together can generate certain advantages. By clustering, businesses can enjoy
cost savings and efficiencies arising from economies of scale. For example, firms in a
cluster can increase their profitability by doing business with nearby firms and customers,
thereby reducing transaction costs. A cluster of firms in a certain industry tends to have a
snowball effect by attracting similar firms, specialized resources, and support activities. In
this way, clusters facilitate increased access not only to suppliers and customers but also to
industry-specific inputs like a skilled workforce, technology, financing, support services,
and infrastructure."); see also C. Tyler Mulligan & Lisa Stifler, Building Assets for the
Rural Future: Identify Rural Industry Clusters, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF Gov'T,
http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/1855 (last visited May 6, 2013) (describing a marine trades
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examples above, and therefore might not be considered as
diversifying, are residential developments, which do not themselves
generate economic activity beyond a short period of construction.2 00
Likewise, the construction of speculative office space may result in a
new structure but adds no diversification to an economy-only the
company that actually occupies the space and employs new workers
can claim to offer such a benefit to the community.201 Even the
addition of new retail operations, such as shops, restaurants, and
personal services, is just as likely to destabilize and weaken existing
retail20 as it is to generate new economic growth and
diversification.203
cluster comprised of "boat builders, suppliers, haulers and distributors, as well as end-
users of the boats such as boat rental companies and dealers").
200. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 57 (noting, in the context of residential
development, that construction jobs are temporary in nature and are, therefore,
fundamentally different from the permanent jobs resulting from industrial and commercial
projects and concluding that likely "there is no statutory authority for offering
incentives-beyond public infrastructure-to residential developments"); Jonathan Q.
Morgan, Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic Development Projects, 7
COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV. BULL. 1, 12 (2010), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu
//electronicversions/pdfs/cedb7.pdf ("[A Cost of Community Service ("COCS") study] can
provide insight into the net fiscal impact of broad categories of land uses-agricultural,
residential, commercial, and industrial.... COCS studies conducted throughout the
United States consistently show that industrial, commercial, and agricultural land uses
have revenue-expenditure ratios above 1.0," which indicates that tax revenues exceed the
costs of government services required. "[T]hese studies find that residential land uses have
ratios that are almost always less than 1.0, meaning that fiscally they are a net drain.").
201. It should be noted that a local government is free to construct office space or
contract for the construction of office space pursuant to subsection (b). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 158-7.1(b) (2011). However, to the extent that the local government wishes to
subsidize the eventual occupant of that space by conveying the space to the occupant at a
discounted rate, the conveyance must be conducted pursuant to subsection (d2). See id.
§ 158-7.1(d2). A subsidized conveyance under subsection (d2) is permitted only when the
recipient company creates a substantial number of new jobs and generates the tax revenue
that allows the local government to recoup its subsidy over time. See id.
202. See EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV'TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION: INTERIM REPORT, at iv (2009),
http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffileslibrary/regdev/tifrpt-012609.pdf ("While distribution
effects might yield broader economic benefits when used to redevelop economically
distressed communities, when incentives are used in healthy and prosperous communities
the regional effect may be to destabilize the fiscal health of neighboring areas. This
conclusion particularly applies to retail development. While there is ample justification for
tax expenditures on retail development in underserved areas, overall there seems little
economic basis to support public expenditures for private retail development." (emphasis
added)). The drain on existing local retail is most acute when the new retail operation is
part of a large retail chain. See STACY MITCHELL, BIG-BOX SWINDLE: THE TRUE COST
OF MEGA-RETAILERS AND THE FIGHT FOR AMERICA'S INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES 33-
39 (2006) (describing studies that found the opening of a Wal-Mart reduced a county's
retail employment by an average of 180 jobs, or 3.2%, and reduced county-wide retail
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After looking at the public purpose analysis of incentives in case
law, jobs and tax base rise to the top as the main contributors to net
public benefit. "Diversifying the economy" is less helpful as a factor
in evaluating the net public benefit of an incentive because, in the
absence of further explanation by the courts, we are left to speculate
as to its meaning.20
2. Characteristics of Incentives That Are "Parallel to" Maready
Incentives
Another way to evaluate the sufficiency of an incentive is to
compare it against the defining characteristics of the incentives
approved in Maready. Indeed, Maready's progeny, Blinson and
Haugh, used the Maready incentives as their standard. In Blinson, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the "[p]laintiffs have
made no attempt to demonstrate how the incentives in this case are
legally different from the 24 local economic incentive packages
offered in Maready," and the absence of such a showing led the panel
earnings by an average of $2 million, or 2.8%, and noting instances of smaller retailers
being forced to shut down as a result of a large retail chain store locating in the area). A
local government could of course argue that some unique retail establishments provide
such unusual or specialized retail experiences that new retail customers from outside the
immediate area would be attracted and would indeed impart a diversifying effect in the
economy. However, case law casts doubt on this argument. See supra notes 194-97 and
accompanying text (indicating that courts describe diversification of the economy in terms
of industrial projects and enhancements to the viability of broad industrial sectors, such as
aviation or seaborne commerce).
203. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, EVIDENCE COUNTS: EVALUATING STATE TAX
INCENTIVES FOR JOBS AND GROWTH 22 (2012), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/
PCSAssets/2012/015_12_RI%2OTax%20Incentives%20Report.web.pdf ("In 2010,
Louisiana's economic development agency attempted to determine whether its Enterprise
Zone program was creating some jobs at the expense of others. The agency estimated that
90 percent of the Enterprise Zone jobs in the hotel, restaurant, retail, and health-care
industries were merely replacing existing jobs. This estimate relied on academic literature
that showed the market for these industries tends to be local. The report pointed out the
tax incentive program might be less effective than those of neighboring states, such as
Texas and Arkansas, which prohibit retailers from qualifying for their equivalent tax
credits."). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6010 (West Supp. 2012) (prohibiting a
municipality from offering an incentive "as an inducement or in exchange for locating or
relocating a retail business facility in the city or town"). But see State ex rel. Brown v. City
of Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1143-44 (Okla. 1997) (describing a $400,000 grant of
incentives to a county's largest retailer as satisfying a public purpose under the Oklahoma
Constitution); George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The
Uses and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 449-50 (2011) (arguing
that retail, at times, needs financing support through public finance tools, such as Tax
Increment Financing, "to meet fresh demand based on increases in population and wealth,
or to achieve planning objectives other than the enhancement of the tax base within the
project area, often to resuscitate a moribund downtown commercial center").
204. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
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to follow Maready's precedent. 205 The court in Haugh was equally
direct, stating that "[i]ncentives parallel to those at issue already have
been held to comport to the Public Purpose Clauses of our State
Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison Cablevision,
and we are bound by that precedent." 20 6
In order to give meaning to the comparison being made by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals to the incentives approved in
Maready, the defining characteristics of those incentives must first be
identified. Once identified, those defining characteristics can be
incorporated into this Article's larger framework for analyzing
incentives and used as a basis for evaluating the sufficiency of
incentive proposals. To that end, three categories of incentive
characteristics can be identified in Maready: (1) the key terms agreed
upon for the Maready incentives, (2) the procedures used to approve
the Maready incentives, and (3) the presence of interstate
competition. Each will be analyzed in turn.
a. Key Terms Agreed Upon for the Maready Incentives
In setting forth the facts of the case, the Maready majority
described the incentives at issue:
This action challenges twenty-four economic development
incentive projects entered into by the City or County pursuant
to [G.S.] 158-7.1. The projected investment by the City and
County in these projects totals approximately $13,200,000. The
primary source of these funds has been taxes levied by the City
and County on property owners in Winston-Salem and Forsyth
County. City and County officials estimate an increase in the
local tax base of $238,593,000 and a projected creation of over
5,500 new jobs as a result of these economic development
incentive programs. They expect to recoup the full amount of
their investment within three to seven years. The source of the
return will be revenues generated by the additional property
taxes paid by participating corporations. To date, all but one
project has met or exceeded its goal.207
There are two key terms to draw from this description of the
incentives approved in Maready. First, the incentives were designed
to result in "an increase in the local tax base," with the local
205. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007).
206. Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010)
(emphasis added).
207. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 618-19
(1996).
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governments expected "to recoup the full amount of their investment
within three to seven years" based upon "revenues generated by the
additional property taxes paid by participating corporations." 20 8 Note
that the time period of three to seven years for recoupment is
shorter-and therefore more favorable to the local government-
than the ten-year period allowed in subsection (d2) for subsidized
property conveyances.2 " Second, the "creation" of "new jobs" was
promised in exchange for every incentive.2 10
The incentives at issue in Blinson and Haugh clearly conformed
to the key terms-job creation and increasing the tax base-of the
Maready incentives. Blinson involved a company's promise to create
1,700 new jobs with a capital investment exceeding $100 million, 1
and the incentives in Haugh brought in 210 jobs and a $24 million
investment.2 12
b. "Typical" Procedural Requirements for Approval of
Incentives
After describing the incentives at issue, the Maready court went
on to describe its understanding of the "typical" procedures used to
approve those incentives:
The typical procedures the City and County observe in deciding
to make an economic development incentive expenditure are as
follows: A determination is made that participation by local
government is necessary to cause a project to go forward in the
community. Officials then apply a formula set out in written
guidelines to determine the maximum amount of assistance that
208. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619. In their joint brief, the city and the county stated that
"[i]n every instance, the investment was calculated to guarantee recoupment of the
investment through property tax revenues within three to seven years." Defendant-
Appellants' Joint Brief at 19, Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d
615 (No. 422PA95) (emphasis added). Note, however, that the dissenting opinion provides
a table outlining the capital investment of each incentive as understood by the dissent, to
include one incentive for which the dissent believed-apparently incorrectly-that no tax
base increase was projected. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 736-37, 467 S.E.2d at 632-33 (Orr,
J., dissenting).
209. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(d2) (2011); see also supra Part I.B.4 (describing the
procedural requirements associated with subsidized conveyances of property under
subsection (d2)).
210. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also id. at 736-37, 467 S.E.2d at
632-33 (Orr, J., dissenting) (providing a table listing the number of jobs promised in
exchange for each incentive); Defendant-Appellants' Joint Brief at 14, 19, Maready, 342
N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (No. 422PA95) (indicating that every incentive involved the
creation of new jobs).
211. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 332, 651 S.E.2d 268, 273 (2007).
212. Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816 (2010).
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can be given to the receiving corporation. The amounts actually
committed are usually much less than the maximum. The
expenditures are in the form of reimbursement to the recipient
for purposes such as on-the-job training, site preparation,
facility upgrading, and parking. If a proposal satisfies the
guidelines as well as community needs, it is submitted to the
appropriate governing body for final approval at a regularly
scheduled public meeting. If a project is formally approved, it is
administered pursuant to a written contract and to the
applicable provisions and limitations of [G.S.] 158-7.1.213
Note that the contemplated incentives were made in the form of
reimbursements for specified activities, some of which appear in
subsection (b), such as site preparation,2 14 and some which do not,
such as on-the-job training.215 As noted in Part I.B.1, reimbursements
that do not implicate subsection (b) are authorized pursuant to the
subsection (a) catch-all provision, which imposes no explicit
procedural requirements.2 16 If the court agreed that subsection (a)
imposes no procedural requirements, it never noted that fact. To the
contrary, the court took pains to describe a rather robust set of
"typical procedures" for approval of the incentives at issue:
1. An initial "but-for" or necessity determination is made.217
2. A written guideline or policy is applied to determine the
maximum amount of incentive that can be given to the
receiving corporation.18
3. Expenditures take the form of reimbursements, not
unrestricted cash payments.219
213. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713,467 S.E.2d at 619.
214. § 158-7.1(b)(1), (b)(7).
215. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (referring to reimbursements for
"on-the-job training"); cf § 158-7.1(b) (omitting on-the-job training from the enumerated
activities but noting that the "listing is not intended to limit [permitted activities] by
implication").
216. Appropriations made pursuant to subsection (a) are subject to no explicit
procedural requirements other than the oversight requirements of G.S. 158-7.2. See supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the catch-all
provision, G.S. 158-7.1(a)).
217. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 ("[P]articipation by local government
is necessary to cause a project to go forward in the community."); see also supra Part II.A
(discussing the Emoluments Clause of the North Carolina Constitution and the "but-for"
determination).
218. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
219. Id. The use of reimbursements-as opposed to appropriations "turned over to any
agency or organization other than the county or city for expenditure"-is helpful in
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4. Final approval is made at a public meeting, properly
noticed, with the agenda and materials being made
available to the general public "at least four (4) days prior
to said public meetings." 220
5. A written agreement governs implementation.221
Furthermore, the court's recitation of these "typical" procedures
gained added emphasis from a statement by the majority-made in
the same paragraph explaining how incentives obtain a net public
benefit-that the "strict procedural requirements the statute
imposes" will prevent abuse.222 The court never attempted to
distinguish between incentives that are subject to strict procedural
requirements and those that are not, suggesting that the court
assumed that all incentives were subject to strict procedural
requirements.223
Furthermore, the court implicitly acknowledged that cash
payments made to induce a company to engage in subsection (b)
activities trigger the same procedures as when a local government
engages in those activities directly. Recall that Maready involved
twenty-four economic development incentives paid "in the form of
[cash] reimbursement to the recipient."2 24  Many of the
reimbursements went toward activities that properly fell within the
purview of subsection (b), such as land purchases and construction of
improvements on land,225 but the local governments did not engage in
those activities directly; rather, they subsidized companies in support
complying with G.S. 158-7.2. § 158-7.2; see also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text
(discussing the local government oversight requirements of G.S. 158-7.2).
220. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 731, 467 S.E.2d at 619, 629. Specifically, the court noted
that final approval occurred "at a regularly scheduled public meeting." Id. at 713, 467
S.E.2d at 619. G.S. 158-7.1 imposes no requirement for approvals to occur at "regularly
scheduled" meetings. However, approval at a regular meeting is required for approvals of
certain conveyances of real property under G.S. chapter 160A, article 12. See, e.g., § 160A-
267 (requiring approval at a "regular council meeting" to convey property by private sale);
id. § 160A-271 (requiring approval at a "regular meeting" to exchange property); id.
§ 160A-272 (requiring approval at a "regular council meeting" to lease or rent property).
221. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619. A written agreement is helpful in
complying with G.S. 158-7.2. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
222. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625. See also LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at
97-98 (advising local governments to hold a public hearing prior to approval of economic
development incentives based upon the Maready court's emphasis on the "strict
procedural requirements" of G.S. 158-7.1).
223. The implications of the court's assumption are addressed later in this Article. See
infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
224. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713,467 S.E.2d at 619.
225. Id. at 736-37, 467 S.E.2d at 632-33 (Orr, J., dissenting).
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of those activities through reimbursements.226 The local governments
did not try to avoid the procedural requirements associated with
subsection (b) by suggesting that the use of cash reimbursements
somehow placed the incentives under the purview of procedure-free
subsection (a);227 rather, the local governments followed the
procedural requirements applicable to subsection (b) activities. The
court took note, citing the trial court's finding that incentives "made
pursuant to the provisions of [G.S.] 158-7.1(b) through (f) were
approved ... following publication of a notice of a public hearing ...
as provided in said statute." 28 This statement would make little sense
if the court believed that reimbursements are authorized solely under
procedure-free subsection (a); that would have meant that none of
the Maready reimbursements would have triggered the procedural
requirements imposed on subsection (b) activities.229 Arguably, the
Maready court cut through the form of these transactions to get at
their substance-implicitly recognizing that subsidies for activities
enumerated in subsection (b) were essentially equivalent to engaging
in the activities directly and therefore trigger all of the requirements
of subsections (c), (d), and (d2), such as notice, a public hearing,
substantial job creation, and a contract for investing in property
improvements.230
Two consequences flow from this conclusion and must be
incorporated into the framework. The first is that every incentive that
subsidizes a subsection (b) activity should be approved following a
public hearing as required by subsection (c).231 Notice to the public
226. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
227. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing subsection (a) and explaining that appropriations
made pursuant to subsection (a) are subject to no explicit procedural requirements other
than the oversight requirements of G.S. 158-7.2).
228. Maready, 342 N.C. at 731, 467 S.E.2d at 629.
229. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing subsection (a) and explaining that appropriations
made pursuant to subsection (a) are subject to no explicit procedural requirements other
than the oversight requirements of G.S. 158-7.2).
230. See supra Parts I.B.3-4. Note also that this interpretation accords with the direct
approval and close oversight of expenditures by "any agency or organization other than
the county or city," as mandated by G.S. 158-7.2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.2 (2011). See
supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. Cf LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 157
(suggesting when a "nongovernmental entity proposes to offer an incentive to a specific
company or to engage in any of the projects listed in G.S. 158-7.1(b) and to use county or
city money to do so, [G.S. 158-7.2] probably requires a discrete approval by the county or
city of such a significant use of its funds" and such "approval might best be given after a
public hearing that follows the procedures of G.S. 158-7.1(c)"); supra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text (describing the oversight required by G.S. 158-7.2 when funds
appropriated by a county or city pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1 are turned over to another
agency or organization for expenditure); LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 97-98 (suggesting
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must be made at least ten days in advance of the hearing, and the
contents of the notice must follow the form prescribed in the
statute.232 The second consequence relates more to consideration than
procedure. Subsidies paid in support of property-related activities
listed in subsection (b), such as purchases of property and
construction of improvements on property, invoke not only the
hearing requirements of subsection (c), but also the performance
requirements of subsection (d2) applicable to subsidized conveyances,
which require the creation of a substantial number of jobs and
binding the recipient to construct improvements to generate property
tax revenue.233 For example, when a local government reimburses a
company for site improvements on a company-owned site, it may be
true that the local government is not directly purchasing land,
constructing site improvements, and conveying the improved land to
the company for less than fair market value, but it is engaged in the
economic equivalent.23 4 Therefore, subsection (d2)'s requirements,
pertaining to job creation and contractually binding the incentive
recipient to construct improvements to recoup the subsidy apply?
One related question must be addressed. The local governments
in Maready reimbursed companies for specific, named activities-for
example, construction of "site improvements." 236 It is more common
today, however, for cash incentive grants to be paid to companies in
exchange for job creation and capital investment that increases the
tax base, without further specifying how funds are to be spent. 7 The
difference is irrelevant. It should be obvious that today's cash grants
subsidize subsection (b) activities whether or not those activities are
that the Maready court identified a requirement for a public hearing prior to making
expenditures pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1).
232. See § 158-7.1(c); see also supra Part I.B.3 (describing procedural requirements
associated with property conveyances). For more detail on the form of notice, see
Mulligan, supra note 75.
233. See § 158-7.1(d2); supra Part I.B.4.
234. Professor Lawrence makes a nearly identical point in his text on economic
development law when he states: "Even though [the local government] has not purchased
and then conveyed property to a company, the local government is doing the economic
equivalent, and the policy of [G.S. 158-7.1] demands that the amount [of the subsidy or
incentive] be returned to the government through taxes and other revenues [pursuant to
Subsection (d2)]." LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 107.
235. See § 158-7.1(d2); supra Part I.B.4. Subsection (h), enacted after Maready, now
imposes a separate requirement for incentive recipients to meet job creation and capital
investment targets regardless of whether a subsection (b) activity is being undertaken. See
§ 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (describing recapture provisions required in
incentive agreements).
236. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 736, 467 S.E.2d 615, 632 (1996).
237. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 14.
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specifically named. Practically every conceivable manner in which a
company can increase the tax base-purchasing property and
constructing facilities and other improvements on that property-
involves subsection (b) activities and therefore implicates the
procedures imposed thereby. To hold otherwise-to suggest that a
local government can avoid the "strict procedural requirements" of
G.S. 158-7.1 by cleverly omitting any reference to the activities that
must occur in pursuit of increasing the tax base-would strain logic
and elevate form over substance.238
c. The Presence of Interstate Competition
The role of interstate competition is treated separately because
the concept is explained in Maready not with respect to the incentives
at issue-that is, it was not discussed as a key component of each
incentive-but rather, the court mentioned it in the context of
explaining how G.S. 158-7.1 serves a public purpose generally.239
Leading up to its discussion of interstate competition, the
Maready court took note of the "circumstances surrounding [G.S.
158-7.1's] enactment." 240 Although the original statute was enacted in
1925241 and the last substantial revision occurred in 1973,242 the court
repeatedly expressed concern about recent and ongoing competition
between North Carolina and other states. The court first cited a 1989
Legislative Research Commission's conclusion that "[1]ow wages and
low taxes are no longer sufficient incentives to entice new industry to
238. Courts often resist results that elevate form over substance. See Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 156 (1981) (citing Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales,
Inc., 539 F.2d 511(5th Cir. 1976) ("There the court had held under similar facts that it
would be elevating form over substance to characterize a party such as FMCC ... as
anything but a creditor"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) ("The notion that
post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance."); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977) ("Under the circumstances
presented here, it would exalt form over substance to differentiate between the
Washington Commission and a traditional trade association representing the individual
growers and dealers who collectively form its constituency."); Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of
Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 644, 669 S.E.2d 279, 283 (2008) (citing Pyco Supply Co. v. Am.
Centennial Ins. Co., 321 N.C. 435, 443, 364 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1988) for the notion that
denying "a party his day in court because of his 'imprecision with the pen' would 'elevate
form over substance' and run contrary to notions of fundamental fairness").
239. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 625-26.
240. Id. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 626.
241. Act of Feb. 19, 1925, ch. 33, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 20 (codified as amended in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 158-1 to -7.4 (2011)).
242. See supra note 64.
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our State, especially to our most remote, most distressed areas." 243
The court observed that "the pressure to induce responsible
corporate citizens to relocate to or expand in North Carolina is not
internal only, but results from the actions of other states as well."2"
The court thought it "unrealistic to assume that the State will not
suffer economically in the future if the incentive programs created
pursuant to [G.S.] 158-7.1 are discontinued," given that the state is
"competing with inducements to industry offered through legislative
enactments in other jurisdictions. "245 The court was concerned about
capturing economic development "which might otherwise be lost to
other states."246 From this, it is clear that interstate competition
weighed heavily on the Maready majority's analysis.
The importance of interstate competition was almost tested in
Haugh. There, the challenged incentive induced a company to move
just across the county line from Wake County to Durham County.247
The plaintiffs attempted to present the facts "as a novel case of
intrastate competition between adjacent counties." 24 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals was asked to invalidate the incentive as
inducing a "wholly intrastate relocation" that did not serve a public
purpose.249 However, after a close examination of the facts, the court
determined that the company was also considering a move to
California, so the case was "not solely one of intrastate competition
between Wake County and Durham."2"o With interstate competition
present, the facts were "materially indistinguishable" from prior court
of appeals holdings and from Maready.25 1 This analysis is noteworthy
because the court took the time to examine Maready's statements
regarding interstate competition and attracting development that
"might otherwise be lost to other states."25 2 Rather than dismissing
243. Maready, 342 N.C. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 726-27, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
247. Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306-07, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816-17
(2010).
248. Id. at 317, 702 S.E.2d at 823.
249. Id. at 314, 702 S.E.2d at 821.
250. Id. at 318, 702 S.E.2d at 823.
251. See id.; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text (quoting the statement in
Haugh that the court was bound by precedent to hold that incentives parallel to those
approved in Maready serve a public purpose).
252. Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 318, 702 S.E.2d at 823 ("The potential impetus to
economic development, which might otherwise be lost to other states, likewise serves the
public interest." (citing Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 727, 467 S.E.2d
615, 627 (1996))); see also Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 337, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276
(2007) (quoting the same language from Maready regarding other states).
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the plaintiff's argument out of hand, the court took interstate
competition seriously and thereby raised the possibility that a future
court might consider invalidating a wholly intrastate incentive as
failing to achieve a public purpose-thus necessitating its inclusion in
this Article's framework for analyzing incentives. 253
C. Summary of Constitutional Analysis
The key points from the above discussion on the constitutional
issues to consider when evaluating incentives can be reorganized
along the three dimensions of this Article's proposed framework for
analyzing incentives: means, consideration, and procedural
requirements. Each dimension will be addressed in turn.
1. Allowable Means for Incentives Under Case Law
The Maready decision is quite clear in stating that the North
Carolina Constitution places no restrictions on the allowable means
of providing incentives. As the opinion notes, G.S. 158-7.1, read in
conjunction with the broad construction statutes, suggests "an evident
legislative purpose to give local governments considerable flexibility
and discretion to execute the perceived public purpose of economic
development in communities within their jurisdictions."25 4 As noted
previously, the Maready court opined that even the most "innovative
activities" were permissible, provided that they serve a public
purpose.255 Therefore, the means used by local governments is not the
253. Because the Haugh court treated interstate competition as a factual
determination-it is either present or it is not-it will be inserted into the framework as a
characteristic of the incentives approved in Maready. See Haugh, 208 N.C. App at 317, 702
S.E.2d at 823 ("Plaintiffs appear to attempt to distinguish the case sub judice from our
holdings in Peacock and Blinson and our Supreme Court's holding in Maready by framing
this as a novel case of intrastate competition between adjacent counties.... We are not
persuaded, and hold that Shalvoy's undisputed deposition testimony contradicts plaintiff's
position and places the remaining issues squarely within the purview of holdings that we
are not at liberty to revisit.").
254. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 729, 467 S.E.2d 615, 628 (1996).
255. Id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 615; accord Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 316-19, 702 S.E.2d at
822-23; Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 338, 651 S.E.2d at 276; Peacock v. Shinn, 139 N.C. App.
487, 495, 533 S.E.2d 842, 848 (2000) (holding that an operating agreement for a coliseum
serves a public purpose where "a private party ultimately conducts activities which, while
providing incidental private benefit, serve a primary public goal"); cf Wood v. Comm'rs of
Oxford, 97 N.C. 227, 232, 2 S.E. 653, 655-56 (1887) ("It may be conceded that a
municipality could not have power to donate its revenues or credits to individuals or
corporations in aid of a merely private enterprise or industry, because in that case the
object is simply private gain. It does not, in its nature and purpose, tend to afford public
advantage. But it is otherwise when the enterprise or industry is public in its nature and
purpose, and intended to confer public benefit, as well as secure private gain to its owners,
as in case of a projected railroad. Although the road may belong to a private corporation,
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focal concern of the court's public purpose analysis;256 rather, it is the
consideration-the public benefit received in exchange for the
incentive25 7-and the procedures for approving incentives5 8 that are
paramount.
2. Consideration Required in Exchange for Incentives Under Case
Law
Our earlier examination of the Exclusive Emoluments Clause led
to the conclusion that a local government must make a "but-for" or
necessity determination as a threshold test of adequate
consideration. 26 That is, an incentive for a company under G.S. 158-
7.1 is permitted only where the company's performance (typically in
terms of job creation and increasing the tax base) would not occur
"but for" the incentive.26 1 It would be impermissible, for example, for
a local government to pay a business to do something that the
business would have done anyway without the incentive.262 Our
earlier analysis of public purpose further supports the use of a "but-
for" determination when approving an incentive. As noted, the
Maready court lauded the "strict procedural requirements" associated
with economic development incentives,263 and, in that case, the local
government's "typical procedures," as described by the court,
included a necessity determination as part of the incentive approval
process.2" Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that a "but-for" or
necessity determination is a necessary component of any incentive
approval process.
still its purpose is directly for the public benefit and advantage. A chief purpose of
counties, cities, and towns is to secure public advantage and convenience, and thus public
prosperity, by means of public works and enterprise, set on foot and prosecuted by
themselves, or through individuals or corporations, and it can make no difference whether
such works are encouraged by the county or town by taking the capital stock of a
corporation, or by a donation of money or credit to it. In either case the public benefit, or
supposed benefit, is in substance paid for.").
256. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 720, 467 S.E.2d at 623 ("Moreover, the Court's focal
concern in [prior cases], the means used to achieve economic growth, has also been
removed by constitutional amendment.").
257. See supra Part II.B.1.
258. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
259. Compare this conclusion with the conclusion in Part I.C.1: "[M]ost of the
limitations found in G.S. 158-7.1 pertain not to the means of undertaking economic
development activities, but rather to the consideration expected in return for an incentive
and procedural requirements related to approval of incentives."
260. See supra Part II.A.
261. See supra Parts I.C.2, IIA, II.B.1, II.B.2.
262. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
264. See Maready v. Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996).
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Beyond the "but-for" determination, each incentive should
obtain adequate consideration in terms of public benefit." The
question is what criteria to apply in order to determine whether an
incentive provides sufficient public benefit. As established, the
criteria can be drawn from two aspects of Maready: (1) the four
factors ensuring a net public benefit2 66 and (2) the defining
characteristics of the approved incentives.267 By merging the four net
public benefit factors with the characteristics of the Maready
incentives, four forms of consideration emerge: job creation,
increasing the tax base, economic diversification, and interstate
competition. Those four forms of consideration, with supporting
statements from Maready, are summarized in the table below.
Factor Sutpport iin Maready
Maready net public benefit obtained by
"providing displaced workers with continuing
employment opportunities. "268
Maready net public benefit obtained by
"attracting better paying and more highly
skilled jobs."269
Maready: "[G.S.] 158-7.1, which is intended to
alleviate conditions of unemployment and ...
increase the local tax base, serves the publicJob creation interest. 2 70
Maready dissent's repeated characterization:
"simply creating new jobs and increasing the
tax base is a public purpose .. "2
Key term of Maready incentives: "creation" of
"new jobs" was promised in exchange for every
incentive27 2 (plaintiffs in Haugh and Blinson
were unable to distinguish the incentives at
I issue from Maready incentives273).
265. See id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (holding that economic development incentives
serve a public purpose "so long as they primarily benefit the public and not a private
party").
266. See supra Part II.B.1.
267. See supra Part II.B.2.
268. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724,467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 737, 467 S.E.2d at 633 (Orr, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added).
273. See Haugh v. City of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010);
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Subsidy of subsection (b) property-related
activities treated as engaging in activities
directly, therefore triggering related
requirements, including substantial job creation
under subsection (d2), consistent with
Maready's emphasis on the statute's "strict
procedural requirements." 274
Maready net public benefit obtained by
"enlarging the tax base."275
Maready: "[G.S.] 158-7.1, which is intended to
alleviate conditions of unemployment and ...
increase the local tax base, serves the public
interest." 276
Maready dissent's repeated characterization:
"simply creating new jobs and increasing the tax
base is a public purpose." 277
Key term of Maready incentive: incentives
resulted in "increase in the local tax base," with
local governments expecting "to recoup the full
Increasing the tax amount of their investment within three to
base seven years" based upon "revenues generated
by the additional property taxes paid by
participating corporations 278 (plaintiffs in
Haugh and Blinson were unable to distinguish
the incentives at issue from Maready
incentives 279).
Subsidy of subsection (b) property-related
activities treated as engaging in activities
directly, therefore triggering related
requirements, including constructing
improvements to generate tax revenue under
subsection (d2), consistent with Maready's
emphasis on the statute's "strict procedural
requirements. "280
Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007).
274. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text; Part II.B.2.b.
275. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
277. Id. at 737, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (Orr, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added).
279. See Haugh v. City of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010);
Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007).
280. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text; Part II.B.2.b.
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Economic Maready net public benefit obtained by
diversification "diversifying the economy." 281
"The potential impetus to economic
Interstate development, which might otherwise be lost to
competition other states, likewise serves the public
interest."282
All four forms of consideration will be added as factors for
analysis in this Article's proposed framework, but it should be
obvious from the table above that two forms of consideration have
considerably more support: job creation and increasing the tax base.
This suggests that the other two forms of consideration-diversifying
the economy and interstate competition-may carry less weight when
a court determines whether an incentive serves a public purpose. This
difference in weighting will be addressed in this Article's final
framework for analysis.
3. Procedural Requirements for Approval of Incentives Under Case
Law
The Maready court, in its public purpose analysis, looked
favorably upon the "strict procedural requirements" of G.S. 158-
7.1.283 There are two possible sources of "strict procedural
requirements" to which the court may have been referring: (1) the
"typical procedures" used by the local governments in Maready and
described in the opinion,284 and (2) the implicit assumption in
Maready that subsidizing a subsection (b) activity triggers the same
procedural requirements as engaging in the activity directly.285 By
taking a conservative approach, in which these two sources of
procedural requirements are compared and the stricter of each is
taken, three additional factors for this Article's proposed framework
emerge that were not already identified:286 notice and hearing prior to
approval,2 87 written agreement governing implementation,28 8 and
281. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627.
283. Id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
286. Some requirements pertain to job creation, increasing the tax base, and the "but-
for" determination already discussed above, so they are not repeated here. See supra Part
II.C.2.
287. The typical approval procedures described for the Maready incentives included
notice and approval at a "regularly scheduled public meeting." Maready, 342 N.C. at 713,
467 S.E.2d at 619; see also supra Part II.B.2.b (describing the typical procedures for
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written incentive guidelines or policy.28 9 These additional factors will
be described in greater detail when the framework's procedural
components are assembled in Part III.D.
III. ASSEMBLING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
During the course of incentive negotiations, at some point a local
government will need to determine the statutory and constitutional
validity of the incentive transaction. The essential components of a
framework for analyzing incentives have already been discussed:
Parts I and II analyzed two general sources of law-statutes and case
law-and merged them with the three dimensions-means,
consideration, and procedural requirements-of this Article's
proposed framework for analyzing incentives. This Part arranges the
various components already discussed into a single comprehensive
framework. The three dimensions of the framework-means,
consideration, and procedural requirements-will continue to serve
as the conceptual scaffold for the discussion.
A. Allowable Means for Incentives
Most of the limitations imposed by G.S. 158-7.1 pertain not to
the means of undertaking economic development activities, but rather
to the consideration expected in return for an incentive and the
procedural requirements related to approval of incentives.290
approval of the incentives in Maready). Expenditures for subsection (b) activities trigger a
requirement for notice and a public hearing under subsection (c). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 158-7.1(c) (2011). For this Article's framework, these two procedural requirements are
compared and the stricter is taken. In this case, a public hearing, properly noticed, is a
stricter procedure than approval at a "regularly scheduled public meeting" without notice
requirements or an opportunity for the public to be heard. Accordingly, the strict
procedural requirement described in the framework is notice and public hearing.
288. The typical procedures described by Maready included administering the
incentives pursuant to a "written contract." Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619;
see also supra Part II.B.2.b (describing the typical approval procedures for the incentives
in Maready). When a local government subsidizes subsection (b) activities, "the governing
board ... shall contractually bind the purchaser" pursuant to subsection (d2). See § 158-
7.1(d2). The two requirements are essentially identical and are represented in this
Article's framework as a single procedural factor: written agreement required.
289. The typical approval procedures described by Maready included applying "written
guidelines to determine the maximum amount of assistance that can be given to the
receiving corporation." Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also supra Part
II.B.2.b (describing the typical approval procedures for the incentives in Maready). There
is no equivalent requirement in the statutes. Taking a conservative approach, this
procedural requirement is inserted into the Article's framework as written guidelines or
policy applied.
290. See supra Part I.C.
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Additionally, analysis of the North Carolina Constitution concluded
that the constitution places essentially no restrictions on the allowable
means of providing incentives. 29' There are a few limitations in the
law pertaining to utility and property tax rates, but the broad
authority to make appropriations for economic development under
subsection (a) of G.S. 158-7.1 easily overcomes that minor barrier as a
practical matter.29
It must, therefore, be concluded that North Carolina law allows
local governments broad discretion in the means used to effectuate
economic development under G.S. 158-7.1. Accordingly, as means is
not a determinative factor in evaluating the validity of an incentive, it
will not be emphasized in the final version of this Article's
framework. A local government is free to be creative in crafting the
means used to induce a company to locate within its borders, ranging
from offering a subsidized loan (containing features such as lower-
than-market interest rates,293 favorable payment terms,294 or
inadequate security2 95) to paying for relocation services to site
291. See supra Part II.C.
292. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
293. A lower-than-market interest rate is, in effect, a grant to the borrower. The grant
simply sits alongside the loan and is properly viewed as either buying down the interest
rate or subsidizing the interest payments of the borrower. Such favorable loans amount to
an incentive or grant payment to the borrower. See Mulligan, Local Government
Assistance, supra note 22. As an aside, it should be noted that offering favorable loan
terms to a business as an incentive makes little business sense from a local government
perspective. Any loan made by a local government to a business should be less favorable
to the business than a conventional loan for two reasons. First, if a business has turned to
the local government for a loan, then it suggests that the business was unable to obtain a
loan from a conventional lender. This means the local government's capital is more
valuable and justifies a higher rate of interest. Second, the local government wants to
create an incentive for the business to refinance the loan with a private commercial lender
as soon as possible. If the local government offers overly favorable terms, then the
borrower will be unwilling to refinance, thus preventing the local government from freeing
its capital for other public purposes. Note, also, that using less favorable loan terms helps
determine the necessity for the loan; that is, a business would not take a less favorable
loan from a local government if it could have obtained cheaper financing from a
conventional lender.
294. Examples of favorable payment terms include a longer-than-usual term to
maturity or, as requested by one developer in the author's experience, a loan to be paid
back only as a project's profits allowed, transferring nearly all of the risk associated with
the project from the developer to the public. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON RISK RETENTION 77-82 (2010), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.pdf
(discussing several types of federally-subsidized loans as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010, including Federal Housing Authority loans to borrowers with poor credit or
inadequate securitization, as well as small business loans with favorable term lengths).
295. Inadequate security would be collateral or other forms of security that are less
substantial than what would be required by a conventional lender. See id.
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preparation to straight cash grants.296 The limiting factors are not the
means used, but rather the consideration received in exchange for an
incentive and the procedure followed for its approval.
B. Primary Forms of Consideration Required in Exchange for
Incentives
North Carolina's statutes and case law provide ample guidance
with respect to the consideration required in exchange for economic
development incentives.297 However, this Article's analysis revealed
that some forms of consideration carry more weight than others.
Specifically, jobs and tax base were the forms of consideration
emphasized above all others. The distinction between those two
forms of consideration and the rest is so stark that it necessitates
dividing the various forms of consideration into two categories:
primary and secondary. The primary factors will be described in this
Section, and secondary factors will follow in Section C of this Part.
Before discussing the primary factors, however, it is worth
mentioning again that a threshold "but-for" or necessity
determination should be made for every incentive as discussed above
in Part II.C.2. Due to the procedural nature of this particular
determination, coupled with the fact that it was listed as one of the
"typical procedures" used in approving the incentives at issue in
Maready, the "but-for" determination will be included later in the
portion of the framework devoted to procedural requirements.
1. Job Creation
If there is one essential factor in ensuring a net public benefit
from an incentive, it is job creation. Of the four factors the Maready
court listed as contributing to the net public benefit of incentives, half
pertain to job creation: "providing displaced workers with continuing
employment opportunities" and "attracting better paying and more
highly skilled jobs."29 8 The Maready majority also stated that G.S.
158-7.1 serves a public interest because it was "intended to alleviate
conditions of unemployment. "299 Jobs were half of the Maready
296. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 736, 467 S.E.2d 615, 632
(1996).
297. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.C.2.
298. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added); supra Part II.C.2.
299. Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
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dissent's oft-repeated, never-rebutted refrain, "simply creating new
jobs and increasing the tax base is a public purpose." 30
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has consistently refused to
invalidate incentives that are parallel to those approved in Maready.30 1
Every economic development incentive offered pursuant to G.S. 158-
7.1 and reviewed by North Carolina appellate courts-in Maready
and thereafter-has obtained a promise of job creation from each
recipient company.302
The statute serves to reinforce the importance of job creation.
First, every economic development agreement "shall" contain
provisions to recapture appropriated funds from companies that fail
to live up to their job creation promises.3 03 Second, any conveyance of
property authorized under G.S. 158-7.1-subsidized or not-is subject
to the statute's explicit assumption that jobs will result from the
transaction. " That is, even when a local government receives fair
market value for a conveyance of property to a company, the
governing board must nonetheless determine the probable "wage to
be paid to workers" on the property.3 05 Third, when a property
conveyance is subsidized, that conveyance must result in the creation
300. Id. at 734-42, 467 S.E.2d at 631-36 (Orr, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see
supra Part II.C.2.
301. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814,824 (2010)
("Incentives parallel to those at issue already have been held to comport to the Public
Purpose Clauses of our State Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison
Cablevision, and we are bound by that precedent." (emphasis added)); Blinson v. State,
186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007) ("Plaintiffs have made no attempt to
demonstrate how the incentives in this case are legally different from the 24 local
economic incentive packages offered in Maready .... In the absence of a showing of some
distinction between the incentives in this case and the incentives in the Maready case, we
hold that ... the [challenged incentives] did not violate the Public Purpose Clauses."
(emphasis added)).
302. See supra Parts II.B.2.a, II.C.2. The incentives at issue in Blinson garnered a
promise of 1,700 new jobs. Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 332, 651 S.E.2d at 268. The incentives
in Haugh brought in 210 jobs. Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 306, 702 S.E.2d at 816. It should be
noted that construction jobs-jobs in the construction trades that are temporarily used
during the construction of a facility but are not permanently employed at the facility upon
completion-are not mentioned in Maready and therefore could not be said to be parallel
to the job creation described in Maready. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 57 (noting, in
the context of residential development, that construction jobs are temporary in nature and
are, therefore, fundamentally different from the permanent jobs resulting from industrial
and commercial projects).
303. See supra Parts I.B.6, I.C.2.
304. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(d) (2011); see also supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the
procedural requirements for appropriations authorized by G.S. 158-7.1(b) and for
unsubsidized conveyances of property); Part I.C.2 (discussing the consideration required
by statute in exchange for incentives).
305. § 158-7.1(d).
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of a "substantial number of jobs" paying at least the county's average
wage.3 06 It was concluded that these requirements pertaining to
subsidized property conveyances probably apply whenever incentives
are paid with the expectation that property-related activities, such as
purchases of property and construction of improvements on property,
will result.0
A review of cases from outside of North Carolina, upon which
the Maready court explicitly relied,0 demonstrates that job creation
is the most frequently mentioned factor in assessing the public benefit
of economic development expenditures that involve private benefit.
Of the forty-six states with cases cited in Maready, thirty-three states
explicitly cited job creation (and another seven used a broad
"economic welfare" factor that arguably encompasses job creation) as
a factor to hold that economic development expenditures were for a
public purpose.'
306. Id. § 158-7.1(d2); see also supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the special accounting
procedures for subsidized conveyances of property); Part I.C.2 (discussing the
consideration required in exchange for incentives).
307. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text; supra Parts II.B.2.b, II.C.2.
308. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 725-27, 467 S.E.2d 615, 625-
27 (1996). The Supreme Court of North Carolina noted the external pressures resulting
from the fact that economic development incentives were being offered in other states:
In the economic climate thus depicted, the pressure to induce responsible
corporate citizens to relocate to or expand in North Carolina is not internal only,
but results from the actions of other states as well. To date, courts in forty-six
states have upheld the constitutionality of governmental expenditures and related
assistance for economic development incentives.
Id. at 725, 467 S.E.2d at 626.
309. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 177 A.2d 205, 213 (Del. 1962) (per curiam)
(describing the legislative findings of the statute to continue the "steady employment of its
citizens" and defining unemployment as "an evil properly the subject of state action for
remedy"); Potter v. Judge, 444 N.E.2d 821, 824-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (noting the
legislative purpose of "reducing unemployment, expanding commerce, and enlarging
municipal tax bases" and upholding the statute as having a proper public purpose); Hayes
v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Ky. 1987) ("[T]he relief of
unemployment is a public purpose within the purview of the case law and the
constitution."); Williams v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 638 A.2d 74, 79-80 (Md. 1994)
(upholding use of public funds for a "privately owned lingerie factory [that] promoted
employment and thereby served [a] public purpose" (citing City of Frostburg v. Jenkins,
136 A.2d 852, 855-56 (Md. 1957))); State ex reL Wagner v. St. Louis Cnty. Port Auth., 604
S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) ("The Court [in an earlier opinion] held that the
issuance of revenue bonds for ... facilities did serve the essential public purposes of
improving employment and stimulating the economy."); Fickes v. Missoula Cnty., 470 P.2d
287, 292 (Mont. 1970) ("The county commissioners expressly find the project will be of
value as a source of employment and county revenue.... Thus, a valid public purpose
appears."); State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Nev. 1973) (upholding a
statute "designed to encourage industry to locate or remain in this State in order to relieve
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Accordingly, it is not difficult to conclude that job creation is the
most important factor in evaluating an incentive transaction."'
However, this does not put an end to the inquiry into the role of job
creation. Two related considerations arise in this context.
The first consideration pertains to the difference between job
retention and job creation.311 Under the right circumstances, they are
equivalent. To give an example, say that a company owns two
manufacturing facilities-one in North Carolina and another outside
of the state. The company believes it has too much manufacturing
capacity and intends to shut down one of those two facilities on
January 1 of the coming year and upgrade the other with new
equipment. The company goes to each jurisdiction and requests
incentives, indicating that incentives from the local government will
factor into its decision about which facility will be closed and which
will remain in operation. Can a local government in North Carolina
offer incentives to the company? Probably so. After all, should the
company elect to shutter the North Carolina facility, the number of
jobs maintained there by the company as of January 1 will be zero.
Jobs retained after January 1 can reasonably be viewed as new jobs-
or at least as jobs that otherwise would not have existed in North
Carolina. In this specific context, the public benefit of job retention is,
unemployment and to secure and maintain a stable economy"); Stark Cnty. v. Ferguson,
440 N.E.2d 816, 819-21 (Ohio 1981) ("To create or preserve jobs and employment
opportunities [or] to improve the economic welfare of the people of the state ... is hereby
determined to be in the public interest and a proper public purpose... ." (quoting OHIO
CONST. art. VIII, § 13)); Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 248 A.2d 212, 217-18
(Pa. 1968) (noting that "[a]ll parties are agreed that unemployment is a problem which
falls within the police power of the state" and that the projects at bar would "be effective
means of combating unemployment since they will create jobs directly"); West v. Indus.
Dev. Bd., 332 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tenn. 1960) ("The stated and obvious purpose of the act in
question is to promote industry and develop trade to provide against low wages and
unemployment. Such a purpose is public in nature...."). A complete listing of cases
referring to job creation is provided in Appendix A.
310. A similar emphasis on job creation is seen in the grant requirements for state
incentive programs. See, e.g., § 143B-437.72(b)(1) (requiring "grantee businesses" under
the One North Carolina Fund to enter into agreements with local governments containing
"[a] commitment to create or retain a specified number of jobs within a specified salary
range at a specific location and commitments regarding the time period in which the jobs
will be created or retained and the minimum time period for which the jobs must be
maintained").
311. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 11, 2007, ch. 552, § 1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1899, 1899-1904
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-437.012 (2011)) (enacting state
incentives for a tire company in order to persuade the company to retain jobs in North
Carolina).
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for all practical purposes, nearly identical to the public benefit of job
creation.312
The second consideration pertains to wages. The Maready court
stated that one factor contributing to the net public benefit of an
incentive is "attracting better paying and more highly skilled jobs."3 13
The public benefit obtained by jobs is, therefore, enhanced when
those jobs are "better paying." Additionally, the Maready court
expressed confidence that the "strict procedural requirements" of
G.S. 158-7.1 would prevent abuse of incentives.314 Looking at those
strict procedural requirements, we see that wages are mentioned
twice in the context of property conveyances: once regarding
unsubsidized conveyances and another time regarding subsidized
conveyances. Prior to an unsubsidized conveyance of property to a
company, a local government must determine the "probable average
hourly wage to be paid to workers by the business to be located at the
property to be conveyed."3 16 For a subsidized conveyance of property,
the conveyance must "result in the creation of a substantial number
of jobs . .. that pay at or above the median average wage.""
Taking all of this together, the wages to be paid to workers
should be weighed in determining the public benefit of an incentive,
but wages alone are not decisive. Out of the two net public benefit
factors in Maready pertaining to jobs, only one mentioned "better
paying" jobs, while the other noted the public benefit of providing
employment to "displaced workers" irrespective of the wage.'
Furthermore, the Maready court never described the wages to be paid
by companies receiving the challenged incentives,3 19 so no judicial
312. The issue of whether job retention serves a public purpose was the subject of a
lawsuit following the enactment of state incentives to induce large manufacturers to retain
jobs rather than create new jobs. Complaint and Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 11-
12, Richards v. State, No. 07-CVS-20487 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2007). Plaintiff's
complaint was dismissed at the trial level and not appealed. Order Granting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Richards v. State, No. 07-CVS-20487 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 23,
2011).
313. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added); see also Haugh v.
Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010) ("[A]s noted in
Maready, expenditures 'should ... attract[] better paying and more highly skilled
jobs....' (quoting Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625)).
314. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625; see supra notes 221-22 and
accompanying text.
315. § 158-7.1(d), (d2) (2011).
316. Id. § 158-7.1(d); see supra Part I.B.3.
317. § 158-7.1(d2) (emphasis added); see supra Part I.B.4.
318. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625; see supra Part II.B.1.
319. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
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standard was established. 320 Accordingly, high wages may enhance the
public benefit of jobs obtained through incentives, but high wages are
probably not required in every instance.
2. Increasing the Tax Base
Close behind job creation in importance is increasing the tax
base. The Maready court included "enlarging the tax base" as one of
the four factors contributing to the net public benefit of incentives
authorized under G.S. 158-7.1.321 The court also explained that the
statute, "which is intended to alleviate conditions of unemployment
and ... increase the local tax base, serves the public interest."3 22
Moreover, "increasing the tax base" is the other half of the Maready
dissent's unchallenged refrain, "simply creating new jobs and
increasing the tax base is a public purpose."3 23
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has declined to invalidate
incentives that are indistinguishable from those approved in
Maready.3 24 Recall that the incentives in Maready were designed to
increase the tax base on a specific timetable. Specifically, the local
governments in Maready expected "to recoup the full amount of their
investment [or incentive] within three to seven years" based upon
"revenues generated by the additional property taxes paid by
participating corporations."3 25 The incentives in Blinson and Haugh
were no different; each case involved a substantial capital investment
by the company involved. The company in Blinson promised to make
a capital investment in "taxable buildings and equipment having an
initial aggregate taxable value of at least $100 million ,"326 and the
company in Haugh agreed to invest a minimum of $24 million.3 27
North Carolina appellate courts have, therefore, never evaluated a
320. Among the cases testing G.S. 158-7.1, the only specific description of wages
appears in Blinson, in which the economic development agreement at issue characterized
the wages to be paid, averaging $28,000, as "competitive." Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App.
328, 332, 651 S.E.2d 268, 272-73 (2007).
321. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 724,467 S.E.2d at 625; supra Part II.B.1.
322. Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627; see supra Part II.B.1.
323. Maready, 342 N.C. at 737, 467 S.E.2d at 633 (Orr, J., dissenting); see supra Part
II.B.1.
324. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
325. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 625; see also supra Part II.B.2.a
(discussing the key terms agreed upon for the incentive in Maready).
326. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 332, 651 S.E.2d 268, 273 (2007).
327. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816
(2010).
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local government incentive in which the recipient was unable or
unwilling to increase the tax base.3*
A close look at the statutory requirements further supports the
notion that increasing the tax base is an important factor in
determining the public benefit of an incentive. Every economic
development agreement "shall" contain provisions to recapture
appropriated funds from companies that make a "lower capital
investment" than promised.32 9 In the case of a subsidized property
conveyance-that is, when the conveyance amounts to an incentive-
the purchaser must construct improvements "that will generate the
tax revenue" to recoup the subsidy.3 Earlier, this Article concluded
that this requirement pertaining to generating tax revenue probably
applies whenever incentives are paid with the expectation that
property-related activities, such as purchases of property and
construction of improvements on property, will result."'
Additionally, increasing the tax base was a recurring factor in the
public benefit assessment described in cases outside of North
Carolina that the Maready court cited,332 confirming that, after job
creation, increasing the tax base is the most important factor for
assessing the public benefit of an incentive. Thirteen states with cases
cited in Maready directly or indirectly mention enhancing tax
revenues as a valid public purpose or uphold legislation that cites
increasing tax revenues as a valid public purpose.3
328. See supra notes 207, 210-11 and accompanying text.
329. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(h) (2011); see also supra Part I.B.6 (explaining the
recapture provisions required in incentive agreements and proposing the most plausible
construction for the statute).
330. § 158-7.1(d2)(2); see also Part I.B.4 (detailing the special accounting procedures
for subsidized conveyances of property).
331. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
332. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 725 & n.1, 467 S.E.2d 615,
626 & n.1 (1996).
333. See, e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 20 (Me. 1983) (noting that the
project would "improve commerce and create jobs, generating sufficient tax revenues to
repay the state's investment"); Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d
319, 323 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) (noting that "the State of Minnesota will benefit in the
form of ... expanded state or local tax bases"); Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608,
611 (Okla. 1989) (noting that Enid's purchase of a failing university would benefit the
city's economy by ensuring "the continued presence of students who spend in Enid," and
conceivably increase tax revenues through such spending); Mayor & Members of City
Council v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 275 S.E.2d 888, 890 (Va. 1981) ("The Act was designed to
stimulate the economy of Virginia, thereby providing jobs, increasing business activity,
and broadening the state's tax base." (emphasis added)); State ex rel Ohio Cnty. Comm'n
v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 4 (W. Va. 1980) ("It does not require any lengthy discussion to
realize that the renovation, expansion or creation of existing or new commercial projects
gives much the same economic benefit to a community as would comparable activities in
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There is, therefore, ample support for identifying "increasing the
tax base" as a primary form of consideration to be received in
exchange for an economic development incentive, second only to job
creation.
3. Are Both Job Creation and Increasing the Tax Base Essential?
Is it possible for an incentive transaction to fail to obtain a
promise either of job creation or increasing the tax base and still serve
a net public benefit? 334 To date, no economic development incentive
offered pursuant to G.S. 158-7.1 and evaluated by an appellate court
has been deficient in either form of consideration, but certainly a
transaction without both would no longer be "parallel" to the
incentives in Maready, taking it outside of the protective umbrella of
Maready's holding.335 Furthermore, the enactment of subsection (h)
of G.S. 158-7.1-more than a decade after Maready3 36 -cemented the
importance of these two primary factors by requiring incentive
agreements to contain provisions allowing the local government to
recapture funds in the event that promised jobs and capital
the industrial area. Each serves to create or maintain employment and enhance tax
revenues, and thereby operates to benefit the community and public in general."
(emphasis added)); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 794-
95 (Wis. 1973) (deferring to legislative determination that "security against unemployment
and the preservation and enhancement of the tax base can best be provided by the
promotion, attraction, stimulation, rehabilitation and revitalization of commerce, industry
and manufacturing"). A complete listing of cases referring to tax base is provided in
Appendix B.
334. The dual requirement of jobs and tax base is sometimes used for the award of state
economic development incentives. See, e.g., § 143B-437.52 (requiring the committee that
approves such grants to find that "[t]he project will benefit the people of this State by
increasing opportunities for employment and by strengthening this State's economy by, for
example, providing worker training opportunities, constructing and enhancing critical
infrastructure, increasing development in strategically important industries, or increasing
the State and local tax base").
335. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814,824 (2010)
("Incentives parallel to those at issue already have been held to comport to the Public
Purpose Clauses of our State Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison
Cablevision, and we are bound by that precedent." (emphasis added)); Blinson v. State,
186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007) ("Plaintiffs have made no attempt to
demonstrate how the incentives in this case are legally different from the 24 local
economic incentive packages offered in Maready .... In the absence of a showing of some
distinction between the incentives in this case and the incentives in the Maready case, we
hold that ... the [challenged incentives] did not violate the Public Purpose Clauses."
(emphasis added)).
336. See Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 515, § 7, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1657, 1660 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(h) (2011)).
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investment do not materialize.3 37 Even if subsection (h) were
disregarded, job creation and increasing the tax base would remain
crucial forms of consideration, as the rationale for elevating these two
factors is firmly grounded in constitutional analysis found in North
Carolina case law.338 This means that local acts and other legislative
tinkering with G.S. 158-7.1 are unlikely to alter the preeminence of
these factors in evaluating the public benefit of an incentive.
Because job creation is the most important public purpose factor,
it seems inconceivable that an incentive to a private company could
stand without a promise of job creation or retention in return.339
Therefore, the next question is whether a company could receive an
incentive on the promise of job creation or retention alone, without a
promise to increase the tax base. Addressing this issue requires
discussion of additional nuances related to increasing the tax base.
There are at least two ways to increase the tax base: one is direct,
by making a capital investment in real and personal property that
increases property tax revenue;340 the other is indirect, by creating
jobs that permanently increase the incomes of local workers, thereby
leading to consumption that increases the tax base. The Maready
court acknowledged the latter when it reasoned that "[n]ew and
expanded industries ... provide work and economic opportunity for
those who otherwise might not have it," and this, "in turn, creates a
broader tax base."341 From this reasoning, assuming workers reside
and spend their money in the jurisdiction providing the incentive, one
might conclude that a company's promise to create jobs alone is
sufficient to accomplish both primary factors of job creation and
increasing the tax base. However, subsection (h) now appears to
require companies to promise the more direct method of increasing
the tax base-that is, by making a "capital investment."342 In
conclusion, while it might have been permissible under the right
337. See § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (explaining the recapture provisions
required in incentive agreements).
338. See supra Part II.
339. See supra Part III.B.1.
340. See, e.g., Blinson, 186 N.C. App. at 332, 651 S.E.2d at 273 ("[T]he Project will
include taxable buildings and equipment having an initial aggregate taxable value of at
least $100 million.").
341. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 727, 467 S.E.2d 615, 627 (1996);
see also Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608, 611 (Okla. 1989) (noting that Enid's
purchase of a failing university would benefit the city's economy by ensuring "the
continued presence of students who spend in Enid," and conceivably increase tax revenues
through such spending).
342. See § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (explaining how the statute requires
recapture provisions in incentive agreements related to capital investment).
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conditions to offer an incentive for job creation alone prior to the
enactment of subsection (h), it now appears that both job creation
and capital investment are required by statute.
C. Secondary Forms of Consideration
At this stage of analysis, it should be apparent that jobs and tax
base are the most important factors in determining the public benefit
of incentives authorized under G.S. 158-7.1. But, there are additional
factors that are secondary in precedence because they either modify
or qualify the primary factors. That is, after concluding that the
primary public benefit factors are present, courts may also evaluate
the presence or absence of secondary factors-economic
diversification and interstate competition-that shed additional light
on the net public benefit obtained through incentives. A conservative
approach to ensuring the validity of incentives offered pursuant to
G.S. 158-7.1 would seek to include all forms of consideration, primary
and secondary, in every incentive transaction. However, in the
absence of additional case law clarifying the role and importance of
these secondary factors, they will remain subordinate to the primary
factors.
1. Diversifying the Economy
The Maready court listed four factors that "ensure a net public
benefit."343 The first three pertain to jobs and tax base, and the fourth
is "diversifying the economy." 3" Diversifying the economy is
categorized as a secondary form of consideration in this Article's
framework because it serves as a modifier to the primary forms, jobs
and tax base. This factor suggests that it may not be enough for a
company to provide jobs and tax-base-generating investment; rather,
the jobs and investment must improve and diversify the economic
base of the community. Part II explored the types of companies that
diversify an economy and concluded that a company that brings a
new type of industry into the area would surely diversify a local
economy; arguably, so would the addition of a new company within
343. Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625.
344. See id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reiterated this test in Haugh: "With
respect to the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test, as noted in Maready,
expenditures 'should create a more stable local economy by providing displaced workers
with continuing employment opportunities, attracting better paying and more highly
skilled jobs, enlarging the tax base, and diversifying the economy,' " Haugh v. Cnty. of
Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010) (quoting Maready, 342 N.C.
at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625).
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an existing and growing industry cluster.345 However, construction of
buildings alone-such as residential, retail, and office space-
ordinarily could not be said to diversify the economy.34 6
2. Interstate Competition
The Maready court explained that "we [in North Carolina] are
competing with inducements to industry offered through legislative
enactments in other jurisdictions."347 The public interest is, therefore,
served by using incentives to attract companies "which might
otherwise be lost to other states."34 From these and other statements
in Maready, Part II concluded that interstate competition weighed
heavily on the Maready majority's analysis.349 Later, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals took these pronouncements seriously in
Haugh. Although the discussion in Haugh regarding interstate
competition remains dicta, the court's treatment of the issue
necessitates its inclusion in the framework as a secondary factor.
Furthermore, the Maready court cited" several cases outside of
North Carolina that considered some aspect of interstate competition
in evaluating the public purpose of economic development
expenditures.351
345. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.347.Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467
S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C.
137, 164, 159 S.E.2d 745, 764 (1968) (Parker, C.J., dissenting)).
347. Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell v.
N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 164, 159 S.E.2d 745, 764 (1968) (Parker, C.J.,
dissenting)).
348. Id. (emphasis added); see also Haugh, 208 N.C. App. at 318, 702 S.E.2d at 823
(quoting Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627) ("The potential impetus to
economic development, which might otherwise be lost to other states, likewise serves the
public interest."); Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 337, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007)
(citing to the same sentence from Maready); supra Part II.B.2.c (explaining the role of
interstate competition in case law).
349. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
350. Maready, 342 N.C. at 725 & n.1, 467 S.E.2d at 626 & n.1.
351. See, e.g., Linscott v. Orange Cnty. Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97, 99-100 (Fla.
1983) (noting that the state's posture on revenue bonds placed it "at a competitive
disadvantage with other states"); Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797,
798 (Ky. 1987) (noting that "Kentucky was involved in a fierce competition with many of
the other states of this nation regarding the location of a major automotive manufacturing
plant"); Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 248 A.2d 212, 218 (Pa. 1968) ("There is
another important factor to consider. Industrial development authorities are so prevelant
[sic] throughout the country that Pennsylvania is at a competitive disadvantage in
attracting industry to this state should we declare this act unconstitutional."); Mayor &
Members of City Council v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 275 S.E.2d 888, 890 (Va. 1981) ("The
General Assembly has rejected these arguments and determined that this type [of]
authority is necessary to promote the economy of the Commonwealth, and enable it to
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D. Procedural Requirements for Approval of Incentives
The Maready court looked favorably upon the "strict procedural
requirements" of G.S. 158-7.1 as preventing abuse of incentives.352
This Article's framework incorporates the court's deference to "strict
procedural requirements" by taking the stricter of either (1)
requirements described as "typical" procedures for the incentives at
issue in Maready,ss or (2) those procedures set forth in G.S. 158-7.1
for the situation most closely analogous to a grant of incentives; that
is, the procedures imposed for a subsidized conveyance of property.354
That comparison left four procedures to be added to the framework:
(1) a "but-for" or necessity determination, (2) notice and a hearing
prior to approval, (3) a written agreement governing implementation,
and (4) a written incentive guidelines or policy. Each will be discussed
in turn.
1. "But-For" or Necessity Determination
As already explained in Parts II.A and II.C.2, a threshold "but-
for" or necessity determination should be made for every incentive;
that is, "but for" the incentive payment to a company, the company
would not locate its facility and jobs in the jurisdiction.35 5 This
determination by the local government prior to awarding an incentive
accomplishes two objectives. First, it ensures that the public receives
valid consideration for the incentive in compliance with the Exclusive
Emoluments clause of the North Carolina Constitution.356 If the
promised public benefit exchanged for an incentive has already
occurred or would be provided anyway without the incentive, then
such an incentive would amount to a constitutionally impermissible
gift. 357 Second, it matches the "typical procedures" for approving the
incentives at issue in Maready358-failure to make a "but-for" or
necessity determination would leave an incentive outside the
compete with other states which utilize this 'tool' to attract industry and promote their
economic growth."); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784,
798-99 (Wis. 1973) ("The development of such programs will also place Wisconsin upon a
competitive basis with neighboring states that heretofore have approved similar
legislation." (footnotes omitted)).
352. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 625; see also supra Part II.C.3
(discussing the procedural requirements described in case law).
353. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also supra Part II.B.2.b
(highlighting the procedural requirements recognized by the court as "typical").
354. See supra Part I.B.4.
355. See supra Parts II.A, II.C.2.
356. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32.
357. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
358. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
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protective umbrella of incentives "parallel" to those approved in
Maready.359 Accordingly, if a local government incentive does not
meet a threshold "but-for" test, then it is likely a fatal flaw making
further analysis unnecessary.
2. Notice and Hearing Prior to Approval
Part I's analysis of G.S. 158-7.1 demonstrated that a public
hearing is required as a technical matter only for approval of a
subsection (b) activity."* But, Part II concluded-after evaluating the
Maready court's comments about "strict procedural requirements"3 61
and determining that cash incentive payments invoke the procedures
associated with subsection (b) activities362-that every incentive that
subsidizes a subsection (b) activity (related to land and facilities)
should be approved following a public hearing as required by
subsection (c).363 To conclude otherwise-to suggest that a local
government could avoid the "strict procedural requirements" of G.S.
158-7.1 by merely subsidizing subsection (b) activities through cash
payments rather than engaging in them directly-would elevate form
over substance."M Aside from creating jobs,365 the only way most
companies are able to increase the tax base is by engaging in
subsection (b) activities such as purchasing property, preparing the
site (to include building upfits and installation of personal
property),366 and constructing improvements. Accordingly, incentives
359. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010)
("Incentives parallel to those at issue already have been held to comport to the Public
Purpose Clauses of our State Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison
Cablevision, and we are bound by that precedent."); Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328,
338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007) ("Plaintiffs have made no attempt to demonstrate how the
incentives in this case are legally different from the 24 local economic incentive packages
offered in Maready .... In the absence of a showing of some distinction between the
incentives in this case and the incentives in the Maready case, we hold that ... the
[challenged incentives] did not violate the Public Purpose Clauses.").
360. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(c) (2011); supra Part I.B.3.
361. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. G.S. 158-7.1(c) requires that the
county or city provide notice to the public at least ten days in advance of the hearing, and
the contents of the notice must follow the form prescribed in the statute. § 158-7.1(c). For
more detail on the form of notice, see Mulligan, supra note 75.
364. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
365. For a discussion of how job creation also leads to an increase in the tax base, see
supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
366. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 736, 467 S.E.2d 615, 632
(1996) (Orr, J., dissenting) (listing "upfitting of rental property" and "facility upfit" as
activities subsidized by the incentives at issue). Note also that subsection (d) requirements
pertain both to the lease or conveyance of "interests in real property" as well as "interests
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paid to induce a company to increase the tax base typically involve at
least one subsection (b) activity and, therefore, the associated
procedural requirements should be followed.367
3. Written Agreement to Govern Implementation
All contracts entered into by municipalities, whether related to
economic development or not, "shall be in writing." 368 Recent case
law suggests the same rule for counties.369 In the economic
development context, there are additional reasons to memorialize an
incentive agreement in writing. Chief among them is that a written
agreement was noted by the Maready court as one of the "typical
procedures" used by the local governments: Once "a project is
formally approved, it is administered pursuant to a written
contract."370 Furthermore, when a property conveyance is subsidized,
thereby invoking the requirements of subsection (d2), the subsidy
recipient must be contractually bound to construct the improvements
necessary to generate the revenue to recoup the subsidy within ten
years. 7' Additionally, a written agreement is arguably necessary to
provide the oversight required by G.S. 158-7.2 for appropriations
"turned over to any agency or organization other than the county or
city for expenditure." 372 Local governments should remain mindful
that a written agreement should include the recapture provisions
listed in subsection (h) of G.S. 158-7.1.373
in property" generally. § 158-7.1(d). The fact that consecutive sentences differentiate
between real property and property generally should probably be understood to mean that
any type of property-real or personal-falls within the purview of subsections (d) and
(d2).
367. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. As a matter of practice, Professor
Lawrence recommends that local governments hold a public hearing prior to approving
any incentive, whether related to subsection (b) activities or not. See LAWRENCE, supra
note 6, at 97-98.
368. See § 160A-16.
369. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
370. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added); see also supra
Part II.B.2.b (describing the typical procedures used for the Maready incentives).
371. See § 158-7.1(d2)(2); see also supra Part I.B.4 (describing the requirements
pertaining to subsidized conveyances of property); Part II.B.2.b (describing the typical
procedures used for the Maready incentives).
372. See § 158-7.2; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (explaining the
legislative history and case law regarding oversight of economic development
expenditures).
373. See § 158-7.1(h); see also supra Part I.B.6 (describing the recapture requirements
of subsection (h)).
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4. Written Incentive Guidelines or Policy to Be Applied to
Determine the Maximum Amount of Incentive
The local governments in Maready applied a set of "written
guidelines" to determine the maximum amount of assistance (or
subsidy) for which each company was eligible.374 To the extent that a
local government seeks to conform as much as possible to the profile
of the incentives approved in Maready,3 75 drafting an incentive policy
is a necessary step. Perhaps just as important, a policy or guideline for
handling incentive requests makes good practice for several reasons.
In the typical incentive negotiation, the local government finds itself
in what can be described as a "prisoner's dilemma," whereby the
"interrogator" is the company negotiating incentives with several
localities and the "prisoners" are competing local governments-the
governmental entities have no way to communicate and cooperate
with each other.376 Although a pre-approved policy or guideline does
not resolve the issue with communicating and cooperating with other
local governments, it can be helpful in shaping how the local
government will respond once placed in a prisoner's dilemma. A
policy causes the company and the local government to acknowledge
374. Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619 ("Officials then apply a formula set
out in written guidelines to determine the maximum amount of assistance that can be
given to the receiving corporation. The amounts actually committed are usually much less
than the maximum.").
375. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010)
("Incentives parallel to those at issue already have been held to comport to the Public
Purpose Clauses of our State Constitution in view of the test articulated in Madison
Cablevision, and we are bound by that precedent."); Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328,
338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007) ("Plaintiffs have made no attempt to demonstrate how the
incentives in this case are legally different from the 24 local economic incentive packages
offered in Maready .... In the absence of a showing of some distinction between the
incentives in this case and the incentives in the Maready case, we hold that ... the
[challenged incentives] did not violate the Public Purpose Clauses.").
376. See Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a
Prisoner's Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the
Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REv. 303, 311-12 (1998)
("The prisoner's dilemma is typically described as follows: Two prisoners are separately
interrogated by the authorities, who attempt to extract confessions from each implicating
the other. If both are silent, each will go free. If both confess, each will get a moderate
sentence. If one confesses and the other does not, the former will get a light sentence and
the latter a heavy sentence. Accordingly, both prisoners would be best off if each remains
silent, but each fears the other will confess. To avoid the danger of the heavy sentence that
would follow from the other's confession, each confesses and incurs a moderate sentence.
The prisoners are unable to reach their preferred outcome (total silence) because they are
unable to communicate and reach a binding agreement. How does the prisoner's dilemma
apply to the situation of state subsidy wars? ... A state that idly sits by while other states
offer investment attraction subsidies will have a heavy sentence placed upon it as mobile
capital and tax revenues accompanying the capital flow to those other states.").
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in negotiations the "opening bid" set by the policy, since in the
absence of a policy, the company can open the bidding at any level it
wishes. The incentive level set in the policy can serve as an "anchor"
in the negotiation, ideally (but not always) pinning the negotiations
over incentive amounts within a range that presumably favors the
local government."'
IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
Fully assembled, and after omitting means as a component,7 the
framework can be represented in summary form as follows:
1. Primary forms of consideration
a. Job creation
b. Increasing the tax base
2. Secondary forms of consideration
a. Diversifying the economy
b. Interstate competition
3. Strict procedural requirements
a. "But-for" or necessity determination
b. Notice and hearing
c. Written agreement to govern implementation
d. Written policy or guidelines to evaluate incentive requests
A conservative approach to offering incentives under G.S. 158-
7.1 would permit such incentives only when companies meet every
form of consideration identified in the framework and only after
following all of the listed procedural requirements.3 9 Any local
government that approves an incentive when one or more of the
factors are not present will assume some risk. The risk is substantial
when one or both of the primary forms of consideration-jobs and
tax base-are missing; it is lessened somewhat when those factors are
present but other factors are missing. In the absence of case law
377. See Adam D. Galinsky, Should You Make the First Offer?, NEGOTIATION, July
2004, at 1-2, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4302.html ("Real estate agents, for
example, should be able to resist the anchoring effects of a property's list price because of
their presumed skill at estimating property values. Testing this theory, researchers . . . had
real estate agents inspect a house and estimate its appraisal value and its purchase price.
[Researchers] manipulated the house's list price, providing high and low anchors. All of
the agents' estimates were influenced by the list price, yet they denied factoring the list
price into their decisions, instead citing features of the property that would justify their
estimates.").
378. See supra Part III.A (explaining why the means used to effectuate economic
development should not be part of this framework).
379. See supra notes 300, 358 and accompanying text.
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evaluating a scenario in which one or more factors are absent, it is
difficult to assess the relative risk. However, as will be illustrated in
the examples below, in many cases it is not even a close call. The
framework makes it simple to distinguish between a clearly
permissible incentive under G.S. 158-7.1 and one that is significantly
flawed.
A. Two Incentive Requests
To illustrate the point, this Part applies the framework to two
different hypothetical, but common incentive requests. The first
incentive request will be referred to as a "classic" request and the
second as a "tax-base-alone" request.
1. The "Classic" Incentive Request
Our "classic" incentive request 80 comes from a manufacturing
company, similar to those that received incentives in Blinson38 1 and
Haugh.382 The company intends to purchase land, construct a $20
million manufacturing facility, and employ 100 workers at the facility.
The company has engaged a site selection consultant to identify
several suitable sites across the nation-their locations remain
confidential-and incentives offered will be among the final criteria
to be evaluated in determining where the facility will ultimately be
built. One of the sites identified by the company is located in North
Carolina, and the county in which the site is located has been asked to
offer cash incentives. As is typically the case with manufacturing
facilities, the wages paid to employees at the facility will exceed the
county's average wage.383
At the moment, the county is considering whether to offer a cash
grant each year for the next five years, with the amount of the grant
calculated to be equivalent to 50% of the additional property tax
revenue generated by the facility. The county is aware that it cannot
adjust the property tax rate for the company,M so the company will
380. The concept of the "classic" incentive request was first advanced in the
Introduction. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
381. See Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 331-33, 651 S.E.2d 268, 272-73 (2007).
382. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306-07, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816-17
(2010).
383. See DAVID LANGDON & REBECCA LEHRMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ESA
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 01-12, THE BENEFITS OF MANUFACTURING JOBS 5 (2012), available at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/thebenefitsofmanufacturingjo
bsfinal5812.pdf ("Clearly, manufacturing jobs are attractive relative to other industries.").
384. An adjustment of the rate would violate the constitutional requirement of uniform
taxation or would amount to an illegal tax abatement. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(2); N.C.
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be expected to pay its taxes in full prior to receiving a grant. An
incentive agreement will govern the arrangement with each year's
grant payment conditioned on (1) the company's investment in its
facility meeting or exceeding the promised amount (thereby
generating the promised additional property tax revenue), (2) the
creation of the 100 promised jobs, and (3) maintenance of the jobs
and operations at the facility continuously during the term of the
agreement. If, at any point during the five-year term, the company
fails to meet all of the economic development agreement's
requirements, the company will not be eligible for any future grant
payments, and payments made in the past will be subject to recapture.
2. The "Tax-Base-Alone" Incentive Request
In the same county, a real estate developer has approached the
governing board with a "tax-base-alone" incentive request. The
developer intends to build a $20 million mixed-use structure in the
county containing retail and office space. The developer's market
analysis shows that the population and economic activity in the local
area are adequate to support the retail businesses likely to be located
at the project. The governing board likes the developer's plan, which
comports with the county's vision for commercial development in the
area.
No tenants have signed leases or purchase agreements for the
space yet, but similar developments constructed by this developer in
the past have resulted in a mix of restaurants, shopping, and office
space for small businesses. There is no interstate competition for this
development. No jobs can be promised because it is the tenant
businesses that will provide the jobs, not the developer. The
developer is unwilling to make any promises about maintaining
operations; again, the tenants will determine whether to maintain
operations, not the developer. The wages to be paid to employees at
the development cannot be determined at this point, as the tenants
will determine the wages. However, the developer's other projects
have followed a familiar pattern: The retail operations likely to locate
at the development typically pay wages below the county's average
wage. There will be construction jobs as the structure is built, but
GEN. STAT. § 105-380 (2011); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining
that while utility and property tax rates cannot be changed directly, cash reimbursements
from a local government's general fund can be used to offset a portion of a company's
utility costs or property taxes).
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those jobs are temporary in nature."' Besides, the developer is not
prepared to promise to create construction jobs or to monitor them,
because the developer will not be hiring any construction workers
directly. Contractors will be used to build out the project. The
developer states that the project cannot go forward in its present form
without financial assistance from the county.
The developer has requested an incentive similar to the one
being considered for the company that made the "classic" incentive
request. That is, the developer seeks a cash grant to be paid each year
for five years in an amount equal to 50% of the additional property
tax generated by the development. The developer is willing to sign an
incentive agreement-and indeed desires an agreement to show the
project's investors a government commitment and to explain how the
investors' returns will be affected-but the content of the incentive
agreement would address only the amount of capital investment. No
mention of jobs or maintaining operations will be made.
B. Factor Analysis of Each Incentive Request
With the "classic" and "tax-base-alone" scenarios laid out, we
can test them against each factor in the framework.
1. Primary Form of Consideration: Job Creation
In the classic incentive request, job creation is a given. The
manufacturing facility will employ 100 workers on-site throughout the
term of the agreement. As is typically seen with manufacturing jobs,
the wages paid to workers at this facility will be higher than the
county's average wage."8 In short, the classic incentives request
clearly offers superior consideration in terms of job creation.
The classic request lies in stark contrast to the tax-base-alone
request, where the developer is unwilling-and, more accurately,
unable-to promise job creation. The developer, after all, is simply
constructing space, not employing permanent workers. If there were
to be any subsection (h)-compliant incentive agreements resulting
from the tax-base-alone project, the tenant businesses would need to
be involved, as only they can promise to create jobs and maintain
them over time."' In theory, it is possible for a developer and a tenant
385. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 57 (noting, in the context of residential
development, that construction jobs are temporary in nature and are, therefore,
fundamentally different from the permanent jobs resulting from industrial and commercial
projects).
386. See LANGDON & LEHRMAN, supra note 382, at 4, fig. 5.
387. See § 158-7.1(h).
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business to seek incentives together, with the developer promising to
construct the project and the tenant agreeing to create jobs, thereby
generating together the necessary net public benefit for incentives.
While theoretically possible, such multi-party arrangements are
difficult to achieve as a practical matter. Developers seek to attract
tenants to their space, and that task becomes more difficult when the
developer demands that tenant businesses sign an agreement with the
local government promising to create jobs and maintain them over a
term of years. Furthermore, were tenant businesses to come to the
table and promise to create jobs as part of a multi-party incentive
agreement, they would certainly expect to receive a portion of any
incentive payments for themselves, adding a new complication to the
developer's negotiation with the tenant over any lease or sale of
space. As a result, multi-party arrangements are rare.8
2. Primary Form of Consideration: Increasing the Tax Base
Both the classic and tax-base-alone incentive requests involve a
$20 million capital investment, so there is little difference between the
two requests in terms of increasing the tax base. In both scenarios, the
local government could expect "to recoup the full amount of their
investment within three to seven years" based upon "revenues
generated by the additional property taxes paid by participating
corporations." 3  One difference exists, to the extent that revenue is
also generated indirectly through job creation,390 because only the
classic incentive promises job creation and related indirect revenue.
Accordingly, even in the tax-base component of the framework,
where the classic and tax-base-alone requests initially appear to be on
equal footing, the classic request still outperforms the tax-base-alone
request.
388. The author has had experience with multi-party incentive agreements involving
one lead company and several associated companies combining their efforts, but in those
cases, the relationship between the various companies at the table was closer than the
typical landlord-tenant relationship. In those multi-party agreements, the associate
companies-subsidiaries, suppliers, or companies otherwise closely related to the
operations of the lead company-were typically required to sign the incentive agreement
and acknowledge that their jobs and investment were being counted toward incentives
being received by the lead company (and, therefore, the associate companies were not
entitled to request incentives separately). The associate companies allowed their capital
investment and job creation to be counted in favor of the lead company because they
highly valued their relationship with the lead company.
389. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996);
see also supra Part II.B.2.a (describing the key terms of the incentives approved in
Maready).
390. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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Note, too, that in both cases the incentive will subsidize property-
related transactions listed under subsection (b), such as purchasing
property and constructing improvements thereon.3 91 This is
particularly clear in the case of the tax-base-alone incentive; the
incentive must be subsidizing subsection (b) activities because nothing
else is being promised by the developer.3" Were a reviewing court to
view this subsidization of subsection (b) activities as equivalent to
undertaking those activities directly-a position consistent with the
substance of the transaction and consistent with the Maready court's
assessment of cash reimbursements under G.S. 158-7.1 39-then the
court would be expected to inquire about substantial compliance with
subsection (d2), which requires job creation.3 94 It is clear that the tax-
base-alone project could not meet these requirements of the statute,
thereby suggesting that the project might not be permitted to receive
an incentive under G.S. 158-7.1 in the first place.3 95
3. Secondary Form of Consideration: Diversifying the Economy
Although the scenario does not provide any information about
the industry involved in the classic incentive request, the fact that the
company is locating a manufacturing facility is probably sufficient to
know that it diversifies the economy. Recall the earlier discussion in
Part III.C.1 suggesting that an industrial or manufacturing facility
serves to diversify the economy whether that facility contributes to a
growing industry cluster or is entirely new to the area.3 96 Additionally,
the higher-than-average wages paid to new workers will infuse
391. See, e.g., § 158-7.1(b)(1)-(4).
392. A related problem arising from the fact that the developer is promising only to
increase the tax base is the possibility that a court would view the substance of the
incentive as amounting to an unconstitutional classification of property by the local
government, violating the principle of uniform taxation or constituting an illegal tax
rebate. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-380 (2011). A comparison of
the tax-base-alone incentive request (amounting to a grant of cash that is related in some
way to the property tax paid by the developer) and the classic request (where the cash
grant is offered in exchange for job creation and the annual maintenance of operations-
in addition to a property-tax-revenue-generating facility) lays bare the issue. The incentive
paid for the tax-base-alone incentive looks much more like an illegal tax rebate or tax
classification than the classic incentive, which can be viewed as an ongoing service contract
for the continuous provision of jobs and economic activity over a term of years.
393. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 731, 467 S.E.2d at 629; supra notes 223-29 and
accompanying text.
394. See § 158-7.1(d2); supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
395. It might, however, be permitted under an alternative source of authority. See infra
Part IV.D (describing alternative sources of authority for cash incentives when jobs are
not promised).
396. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
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households-and the local economy-with money that will further
strengthen and diversify the local economic base.397
It is difficult to argue that the tax-base-alone incentive will serve
to diversify the economy. Retail and office buildings offer space for
commercial activity to take place, but they offer no substantial
economic activity in their own right.398 The tenant businesses
envisioned by the developer, given their retail nature, are likely to
shift household spending from existing retail businesses in the
community to the developer's tenant businesses rather than generate
significant new economic activity.3 99 To the extent that any
diversification can be said to result from the retail and office space
envisioned by the developer, it is very different from the
diversification achieved by the companies evaluated in Maready4
and its progeny.401 The case for the tax-base-alone development to
diversify the economy is therefore weak or non-existent.
4. Secondary Form of Consideration: Interstate Competition
The classic incentive request is made in the explicit context of
interstate competition. The company stated up front that the county
in North Carolina is in direct competition with locations in other
states. An incentive in the classic scenario, therefore, gets right to the
concern expressed in Maready that, in the absence of an incentive, the
company's facility "might otherwise be lost to other states."402
There is no interstate competition in the tax-base-alone scenario.
As already explained, retail space is developed on the basis of local
market conditions and whether households in the area can support
the tenant businesses envisioned for the space. 403 The developer is
almost never in a position to threaten to locate a project outside of
the jurisdiction, let alone in another state, because the market
analysis is almost entirely dependent upon local market conditions
within a short distance of the proposed development.404
397. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
400. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 S.E.2d 615, 618-19
(1996).
401. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App. 304, 306-07, 702 S.E.2d 814, 816-17
(2010); Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 331-33, 651 S.E.2d 268, 272-73 (2007).
402. Maready, 342 N.C. at 727, 467 S.E.2d at 627.
403. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. In the rare circumstance that a
real estate developer is considering a project in a community that straddles a state border,
and provided the developer is truly agnostic about one location in one state and another
location in the other state just across the border, then it might be possible for such a
2013]1 2097
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
5. Strict Procedural Requirements
The last component of the framework to evaluate is compliance
with the "strict procedural requirements" that gave the Maready
court confidence that incentives paid to private companies would
serve a public purpose.405 There are four procedures to consider: (1) a
"but-for" or necessity determination; (2) notice and a hearing prior to
approval; (3) a written agreement governing implementation; and (4)
a written policy or guidelines for determining the incentive amount.
a. "But-For" or Necessity Determination
The first procedure is the "but-for" or necessity determination;
that is, an initial determination of whether an incentive is "necessary
to cause a project to go forward in the community."40 6 The classic
incentive request clearly meets the "but-for" requirement. The
company stated explicitly that the incentives package will be a
determinative factor in its location decision. A company making the
classic incentive request will have no difficulty certifying that "but
for" the incentive, the company will not locate its facility in the local
government's jurisdiction.
The same cannot be said of the tax-base-alone request. There,
the developer is constructing retail and office space that market
analysis suggests will be supported by the population in the area
surrounding the project. The developer selected the location,
expended resources on pre-development of the project (such as site
assemblage, market research, and design, among others), and courted
investors for the project based on the characteristics of the local
population-not on the basis of incentives. If a particular local
market supports the construction of additional retail and office space,
then it does not matter whether this particular developer abandons
the project. Another developer will recognize those same
development to involve some form of interstate competition. A competition over the
location of retail and office space, however, would be of substantially different character
from the interstate competition about which the Maready majority expressed concern, in
which states are pitted against each other in incentive competitions that span the nation,
and sometimes the globe. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 726-27, 467 S.E.2d at 627 (stating it is
"unrealistic to assume that the State will not suffer economically in the future if the
incentive programs created pursuant to [G.S.] 158-7.1 are discontinued," given that "we
are competing with inducements to industry offered through legislative enactments in
other jurisdictions" (quoting Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 164,
159 S.E.2d 745, 764 (1968) (Parker, C.J., dissenting)); see also supra Part II.B.2.c
(describing the role of interstate competition in case law).
405. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 724,467 S.E.2d at 625.
406. Id. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619; see also supra Part III.D.1 (explaining the rationale
for including a "but-for" or necessity determination in this Article's framework).
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fundamentals and construct a similar project independently.4' The
best that the developer in the tax-base-alone scenario could say is that
"but for" the incentive that subsidizes the purchase of land and
construction of the commercial buildings, the project could not go
forward in its proposed form. That is a weak, if not entirely
ineffectual, "but-for" argument, and it is fundamentally different
from the "but-for" determination described for the incentives
approved in Maready, where the incentives were offered to induce
companies to locate in one jurisdiction rather than another.408
b. Notice and Hearing Prior to Approval
The scenario does not provide any information about the
jurisdiction's policy regarding notice and hearing, but compliance is
neither difficult nor controversial in either the classic request or the
tax-base-alone request. Accordingly, we will assume that the county is
able to comply with this particular procedure for both incentive
requests. Were the county to fail to issue notice and hold a public
hearing as required, the transaction could be voided.4 09
c. Written Agreement to Govern Implementation
The written agreement is another matter. Only the classic
incentive request can comply fully with subsection (h); the tax-base-
alone request complies only with a portion. We know at the outset
that, should an incentive be awarded, the parties to both the classic
incentive request and the tax-base-alone request are amenable to
reducing their respective incentive agreements to writing.
Additionally, in each case, the agreement can be drafted so as to
contractually bind the company or developer, as appropriate, to
construct the improvements to generate the tax revenue to recoup
any incentive grant.410 However, only in the case of the classic
407. There are instances in which a public purpose is served by inducing a real estate
developer to locate a development in a particular area, such as a distressed or blighted
area, a redevelopment area, or downtown. However, the statutory authority and public
purpose for incentives in those situations is not based upon Maready, economic
development, or even G.S. 158-7.1. Rather, the authority and public purpose is taken from
urban redevelopment law, community development, or downtown revitalization. These
concepts will be discussed as alternatives to G.S. 158-7.1. See infra Part IV.D.
408. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 713, 467 S.E.2d at 619.
409. See, e.g., Darla Slipke, Nash Wins Sanderson Site Lawsuit, ROCKY MOUNT
TELEGRAM, Nov. 10, 2012, at 1A (reporting a trial court order granting summary
judgment in favor of Nash County, which originally failed to hold a public hearing as
required by G.S. 158-7.1 but subsequently cured the defect by issuing new notice and
holding a hearing).
410. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
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incentive request can the written agreement fully comply with
subsection (h) of G.S. 158-7.1, that is, to include provisions for the
recapture of appropriated funds in the event the company fails to
fulfill its promises with respect to capital investment, job creation, and
maintaining operations at the facility.4 11 It is difficult to see how the
developer requesting the tax-base-alone incentive could enter into a
written agreement committing to job creation and to maintaining
operations at the facility when the developer has no intention of
doing so himself or herself, to say nothing of whether the county
should accept an agreement with a developer who has little control
over performance under the agreement.4 12
d. Written Incentive Policy or Guidelines to Be Applied to
Determine the Maximum Amount of Incentive
In our hypothetical scenarios, there is no indication that a written
policy or guideline is being used by the county to determine eligibility
for, and the maximum amount of, an incentive for either the classic
request or the tax-base-alone request. In the author's experience, the
majority of such policies set forth requirements for capital
investment, job creation, wages, and maintenance of operations over
the term of any incentive agreement.413 Were the county to adopt
such a policy, it is possible that it would exclude the tax-base-alone
request altogether because the developer is unable to promise to
create jobs and maintain operations over some term.
411. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(h) (2011).
412. As noted in the description of the tax-base-alone incentive request, only the
tenant businesses can make such commitments. See supra Part IV.A. The possibility of a
multi-party arrangement remains available. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
413. See, e.g., BUNCOMBE COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES POLICY:
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENHANCEMENT FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-3, http://www.buncombecounty.org/common/admin
/economicpolicy.pdf (last visited May 3, 2013) (providing incentives on the basis of capital
investment and job creation with an adjustment for wages, provided that the "increase in
ad valorem taxes on real and personal property resulting from the project will, in the three
(3) to five (5) years following essential completion of the project, equal or exceed the
amount of funds provided by the County"); CHATHAM COUNTY INCENTIVE POLICY 1-2
(2012), http://www.chathamedc.org/sites/default/files/page-files/Chatham%20County
%20Incentive%2OPolicy%2OFinal%20Format%20-%206-18-12.pdf (noting several
different factors that Chatham County uses to determine whether to award incentives,
including the number of jobs that will be created by the project, the wages and benefits
provided to employees, the total amount of capital investment in the project, the business
type or industry cluster, as well as other "qualitative criteria outlined in [the incentive
policy] and other policy documents").
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C. Summary of Analysis
With our analysis complete, the results of the comparison
between the classic incentive request and the tax-base-alone request
are displayed in the table below.
Primary Forms of Classic Incentive Tax-Base-Alone
Consideration Request Request
Job creation Strong None
Increasing the tax base Strong Strong
Secondary Forms of
Consideration
Diversifying the Strong Weak or none
economy




detrin o Strong Weak or none
determination
Notice and public Yes Yes
hearing
Strong (full Weak (unable to
Written agreement compliance with comply with
subsection (h)) subsection (h))
Not provided (would
probably meet
standards found in provi d
Written policy or typical policies, such (obablytwul
guidelines as investment, job nt meet al
creation, wages, and ta founin
maintiningtypical policies)maintaining
operations)
The difference is stark.414 The classic incentive request includes
all of the important primary and secondary forms of consideration
414. Although the chasm between these two scenarios is wide due to the fact that they
reside at opposite ends of the spectrum, one can imagine scenarios in the middle. For
example, how would a court handle a scenario involving a small main street retail business
that requested an incentive in exchange for a promise to make a small capital investment
and produce two or three jobs, but for which there was no hint of interstate competition
and the case for diversifying the economy was weak or non-existent? In that case, the
primary forms of consideration, jobs and tax base, could be present but insubstantial. The
secondary forms, diversifying the economy and interstate competition, are weak or non-
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and adheres to all procedural requirements, so the county could be
confident of its authority to move ahead with approval of the request.
The classic incentive request can be said to be "parallel" to the
incentives approved in Maready.415
It should be apparent, however, that the tax-base-alone request
is missing almost all of the important elements for ensuring a net
public benefit. The tax-base-alone request is unable to provide both
primary forms of consideration, and it fails to provide any of the
secondary forms. Furthermore, its compliance with the "but-for"
requirement and standards for a written agreement is weak at best.
With so many gaps illuminated by the framework, it is clear that the
county would place itself on shaky legal ground by approving the tax-
base-alone incentive request. It is not "parallel" to the incentives in
Maready; that is, it would be a simple matter for a complaining
taxpayer to "demonstrate how the incentives in [the tax-base-alone
request] are legally different from the 24 local economic incentive
packages offered in Maready."416 Thus, the tax-base-alone incentive
falls outside the protective umbrella of Maready and would be
vulnerable to challenge as not serving a public purpose. This is a
potentially fatal flaw that cannot be routinely fixed by legislation
because its roots are constitutional.
The tax-base-alone incentive request, therefore, appears to be
problematic under G.S. 158-7.1. If the county is intent on assisting the
developer, it will need to consider options that do not involve an
incentive or subsidy to the developer. One possibility is a loan that
contains no subsidy. An unsubsidized loan is one that is more
favorable to the local government lender than a private lender would
demand under the same circumstances; for example, a well-
existent. The business owner may be willing to certify that the business's expansion will
not occur "but for" the incentive, but the local government would understandably be
skeptical because the incentive the local government could provide and still generate a net
revenue would be so small (given the relatively minor capital investment and tax revenue
generated by the business) as to be inconsequential as an incentive. This Article's
framework would reveal that any incentive provided to this business would be on shaky
ground, but could the framework be used to rule out any possibility of an incentive? In the
absence of case law exploring this middle ground, the answer is uncertain. This only serves
to reinforce the importance of identifying other sources of authority for a local
government incentive in these situations-other than G.S. 158-7.1-as described infra Part
IV.D. See Tyler Mulligan, Cash Incentives for Revitalizing Main Street, COATES'
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (Jan.12, 2010, 10:09 AM),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=1622; Tyler Mulligan, Incentives for Infill Development on
Main Street, COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (May 18, 2010, 9:00 AM),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=2428.
415. See Haugh v. Cnty. of Durham, 208 N.C. App 304, 319, 702 S.E.2d 814, 824 (2010).
416. Blinson v. State, 186 N.C. App. 328, 338, 651 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2007).
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securitized loan with an above-market interest rate that imposes a
relatively short term to maturity. 417 A loan that contains no subsidy
for the recipient is akin to an unsubsidized conveyance of property
(sold for at least fair market value) under subsection (d): The
procedural requirements include a properly noticed hearing and a
determination of the probable wages to be paid by the business, but
securing the primary and secondary forms of consideration outlined
in this Article is not required.418 This makes sense in the context of
this Article's discussion. When a means of promoting economic
development does not involve a direct subsidy to a private entity, the
constitutional concerns about the private benefit outweighing the
public benefit diminish. More specifically, they do not implicate the
analysis seen in Maready and further explored in this Article.
Accordingly, an unsubsidized loan may be a viable option for dealing
with a developer who makes a tax-base-alone request.4 19
Can a subsidy or grant ever be offered as an incentive in the tax-
base-alone scenario? Probably not under G.S. 158-7.1. There are,
however, some other sources of authority that could be employed-
e.g., statutory provisions unrelated to economic development that
pursue different public purposes and are, therefore, subject to
separate lines of case law-provided the consideration received by
the local government amounts to something more than just an
increased tax base.
D. Alternative Statutory Authority in the Tax-Base-Alone Scenario
There are several sources of statutory authority, outside of G.S.
158-7.1, that enable a local government to make a grant of public
dollars to a private developer in the tax-base-alone scenario. Note,
however, that "tax-base-alone" is a bit of misnomer, because even the
alternative sources of statutory authority require that the local
government receive something more than merely increasing the tax
base. A full exploration of these authorities is beyond the scope of
this Article, but two deserve brief mention here.
417. Compare to the earlier description of subsidized loans. See supra notes 292-93 and
accompanying text.
418. See Mulligan, Local Government Assistance, supra note 22.
419. See id.
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1. Urban Redevelopment
North Carolina's Urban Redevelopment Law42 0 authorizes a
local government to exercise special statutory powers within a
designated geographic area called a "redevelopment area. "421 The
designated area must be classified as blighted-meaning the growth
of the area is impaired by the presence of dilapidated or obsolete
buildings, overcrowding, or other unsafe conditions-or in danger of
becoming blighted.42 2 One of the powers that may be exercised in a
redevelopment area is engaging in "programs of assistance and
financing, including the making of loans, for rehabilitation, repair,
construction, acquisition, or reconditioning of residential units and
commercial and industrial facilities in a redevelopment area." 423 In
other words, a local government possesses authority to offer
"programs of assistance and financing," presumably including grants,
to developers who agree to construct or rehabilitate buildings in a
redevelopment area.424
The difference between financial assistance offered pursuant to
the Urban Redevelopment Law and incentives offered under G.S.
158-7.1 is the form of public benefit obtained by the local government
in return. In the context of redevelopment, the public benefit is
derived not from job creation and increasing the tax base, but from
attracting development to a blighted area.425 Jobs are, therefore, not a
factor when providing a financial subsidy to a developer in a
redevelopment area. Accordingly, redevelopment powers can be used
to offer a grant in some tax-base-alone situations where construction
in a designated redevelopment area is promised as consideration.
2. Community Development
Municipal and county governing boards possess specific
authority, as part of "undertaking community development programs
420. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-500 to 534 (2011). Municipal governing boards may
exercise the powers of a redevelopment commission pursuant to G.S. 160A-456(b) and
county boards pursuant to G.S. 153A-376(b). See id. §H 153A-376(b), 160A-456(b).
421. Id. § 160A-512.
422. Id. § 160A-503(16), (21).
423. Id. §§ 160A-512, 160A-503(19).
424. Id. § 160A-503(19). The majority in Maready observed that the powers granted to
local governments under G.S. 158-7.1 are analogous to the powers granted by the Urban
Redevelopment Law. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 724, 467 S.E.2d
615, 625 (1996).
425. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has upheld the Urban Redevelopment Law
as serving a public purpose. See Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat'l
Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 606, 114 S.E.2d 688, 696 (1960).
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and activities," to offer "assistance and financing," including "the
making of grants or loans, the subsidization of interest payments on
loans, and the guaranty of loans," for the "rehabilitation of private
buildings" in two situations: (1) "for the benefit of low and moderate
income persons," or (2) "for the restoration or preservation of older
neighborhoods or properties."4 26
This statute provides authority for grants to be offered in the tax-
base-alone scenario, but there are important limitations to note. First,
the grant or other form of assistance must be associated with a
program or activity being undertaken for community development
purposes.4 27 Community development is usually associated with
federal Community Development Block Grants ("CDBG")428 and
other activities undertaken for the benefit of low- and moderate-
income persons.429 Second, assistance and financing that goes toward
"private buildings" must involve "rehabilitation," not new
construction.43 0 Thus, in a tax-base-alone scenario, a local government
is authorized to provide financial assistance for private rehabilitation
activities that occur as part of a community development program for
the benefit of low- and moderate-income persons. A conservative test
for such assistance would examine whether the grant or other
financial assistance would qualify under the federal CDBG program.
Here again is an instance where authority to offer financial
assistance in support of private activity is provided not for job
creation and increasing the tax base, but for a different public
purpose-for the benefit of low- and moderate-income persons.431
Thus, in the tax-base-alone scenario, a grant could be offered to a
private company for undertaking rehabilitation activities that restore
or preserve an older property as part of a community development
program.
426. §§ 153A-376(a) (counties), 160A-456(a) (cities).
427. Id. § 153A-376(a) ("In undertaking community development programs and
activities ... a county may engage in the following activities...."); id. § 160A-456(a)
(providing identical language for municipalities).
428. See 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (2006).
429. See LAWRENCE, supra note 6, at 112.
430. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-376(a) (counties), 160A-456(a) (cities).
431. For a discussion of the public purpose of undertaking activities for the benefit of
low- and moderate-income persons, see In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 60, 296 S.E.2d
281, 286 (1982) (holding that an expansion of a state agency's housing bonds authority to
"help those with 'moderate incomes' " is acting with "the same public purpose in mind" as
assisting low-income families).
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3. Conclusion Regarding Alternative Sources of Authority
This discussion has surveyed two instances in which North
Carolina statutes authorize local governments to provide financial
assistance to private companies in the tax-base-alone scenario.432 The
important lesson is that these alternative sources of authority are
provided in pursuit of public purposes that are different from the
purpose of economic development-which focuses on job creation
and increasing the tax base-as described in Maready. In the case of
the Urban Redevelopment Law, the overriding purpose is to spur
development in a blighted area irrespective of job creation.433
Likewise, authority to subsidize private development activity under
the community development power is limited to rehabilitation of
older properties, principally for the benefit of low- and moderate-
income persons.43 4 These alternative authorities do not require jobs in
exchange for a subsidy, but they are otherwise limited in terms of
geography and purpose.
This provides yet another reason why G.S. 158-7.1 should not be
read to authorize cash grants in the tax-base-alone scenario. If G.S.
158-7.1 was so broad as to authorize cash grants for any private
company in sole service of generating additional tax base, anywhere
in the jurisdiction for any conceivable commercial purpose, then the
limitations and procedures set forth in the alternative statutes just
surveyed would be rendered irrelevant or unnecessary. Indeed, if
such an interpretation were upheld, it would be difficult to conceive
any meaningful limits on a local government's authority to offer
grants to private companies in pursuit of economic development.
Surely this fact would lead a court to resist such an overly broad
interpretation of G.S. 158-7.1.
CONCLUSION
Local governments must field incentive requests not only from
manufacturers who promise ample job creation and capital
432. There may be others, such as downtown revitalization pursued within a properly
designated Municipal Service District. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-536 (Supp. 2012); see
also Kara Millonzi, Funding Capital Projects in a BID (Business Improvement District),
COATES' CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV'T L. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:47 PM),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=4273 (explaining how a North Carolina municipality can
create a business improvement district using a municipal service district for downtown
revitalization). The public purpose limitations of Municipal Service Districts, however,
have not been tested in court.
433. See supra Part IV.D.1.
434. See supra Part IV.D.2.
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investment to increase the tax base, but also from business interests
and real estate developers who are unable or unwilling to promise job
creation. This Article closely examined G.S. 158-7.1 and Maready
along three dimensions-means, consideration, and procedural
requirements-in order to develop a framework for analyzing
incentive requests across the entire spectrum.
In its essence, this Article's framework suggests that subsidies (or
incentives) provided to private companies in pursuit of economic
development should be bounded in two important ways. First, the
consideration obtained by local governments in exchange for the
incentives must be meaningful, primarily in terms of job creation and
increasing the tax base. Second, the approval of incentives should
comply with procedural requirements set forth in G.S. 158-7.1 and
further described by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
Maready.
The framework was tested using two types of incentive requests
frequently submitted to North Carolina local governments: one that
fits the classic Maready mold, and another tax-base-alone request that
omits many of the elements considered important in Maready. This
Article's framework illuminated the missing elements in the tax-base-
alone incentive request, suggesting that such an incentive would have
difficulty surviving a public purpose challenge if granted pursuant to
G.S. 158-7.1. However, other sources of statutory authority-for
other public purposes-might provide an alternative in the tax-base-
alone scenario. Urban redevelopment and community development
are two possible alternatives to G.S. 158-7.1, provided that the
incentive conforms to the statutory requirements and case law of
those alternative authorities.
In conclusion, the value of this Article's framework for analyzing
economic development incentives will be determined by the extent to
which local governments employ it as part of their decision-making
process when confronted with incentive requests. Hopefully, local
governments in North Carolina, armed with this Article's framework,
will be better able to assess the wide variety of incentive requests they
receive and to respond with confidence that they are acting in
conformity with the available legal authority.
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APPENDIX A. CASES CITED IN MAREADY IDENTIFYING JOB
CREATION AS A FACTOR IN HOLDING THAT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES SERVE A PUBLIC PURPOSE
1. In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on
House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875, 884 (Colo. 1991) (en banc)
("The Public purposes specifically enunciated by the General
Assembly in H.B. 1005 include increased employment and
economic development in Colorado.... We conclude that
these public purposes are no less legitimate or particularized
than the public purposes we have approved in prior cases.");
2. Wilson v. Conn. Prod. Dev. Corp., 355 A.2d 72, 76 (Conn.
1974) ("[T]he support of enterprises eligible for assistance
under the act would result in an improved economy for the
people of Connecticut by helping to keep new business in the
state, to provide increased employment opportunities, and to
establish a new source of public revenues."); Roan v. Conn.
Indus. Bldg. Comm'n, 189 A.2d 399, 401 (Conn. 1963)
(upholding industrial projects defined by the statute allowing
for projects that will "provide gainful employment for the
people of the state");
3. In re Opinion of the Justices, 177 A.2d 205, 213 (Del. 1962)
(per curiam) (describing the legislative findings of the statute
to continue the "steady employment of its citizens" and
defining unemployment as "an evil properly the subject of
State action for remedy");
4. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 338 S.E.2d 240, 247 (Ga.
1985) ("The trial court found that the project will promote
and develop the public purposes of trade, commerce, industry,
and employment opportunities. There is evidence in the
record to support this determination.");
5. Potter v. Judge, 444 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(noting the legislative purpose of "reducing unemployment,
expanding commerce, and enlarging municipal tax bases" and
upholding the statute as having a proper public purpose);
6. Hawkins v. City of Greenfield, 230 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind.
1967) (holding "[t]he public purpose to alleviate poverty and
unemployment" is amply supported by the Indiana
Constitution);
7. Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 707 (Iowa 1993)
(noting the legislative purpose of a "continuing need for
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programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of
unemployment" and upholding the statute);
8. Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 801
(Ky. 1987) ("The relief of unemployment is a public purpose
within the purview of the case law and the constitution.");
9. Farlouis v. LaRock, 315 So. 2d 50, 58 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
("The gain to the Parish was the development of an industry
that hired from 170 to 200 persons. Nothing in this
undertaking was violative of any constitutional provision.");
10. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 19-20, 23-24 (Me. 1983)
(noting that the project would "enhance employment
opportunities" and "create jobs" and, while there was not
previously a Maine case upholding job creation as a public
purpose, "the concept of public purpose is not static");
11. Williams v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 638 A.2d 74, 79-80 (Md.
1994) (noting several uses of public funds for public purposes,
despite a benefit to privately owned property, including the
support of a "privately owned lingerie factory [that] promoted
employment and thereby served [a] public purpose" (citing
City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 136 A.2d 852, 855-56 (Md.
1957))); Reyes v. Prince George's Cnty., 380 A.2d 12, 28 (Md.
1977) (upholding an arena project that "employs 400 people,
with an annual payroll of $2,000,000");
12. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 335
N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. 1975) (per curiam) (noting that the
"declared purpose of the proposed bill is the '[stimulation of]
industrial growth and expansion' in order to increase gainful
employment of citizens of the Commonwealth" and that
stimulating job development is a proper public purpose
(alteration in original));
13. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 458-59 (Mich. 1981) (conflating public use and
public purpose in holding that "[t]he power of eminent
domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish
the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and
revitalizing the economic base of the community [and the]
benefit to a private interest is merely incidental" (emphasis
added)), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (analyzing, eight years after
Maready, the Poletown court's conflation of public use and
public purpose, and overruling Poletown not on the basis of
public purpose but because Poletown's interpretation of
"public use ... cannot reflect the common understanding of
that phrase"); City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 144 N.W.2d 460, 469
(Mich. 1966) (en banc) ("[T]he probabilities would seem to
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favor the credits-that is to say, employment and other
benefits to the community and the area as opposed to
additional costs for schools, public utilities, and the hazard of
unemployment.");
14. Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319,
325 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) ("[T]he project will create or
maintain a sufficient number and type of jobs to justify
Authority participation in its financing, and the use of
appropriated monies in the Economic Development Fund for
insurance will enhance the creation or maintenance of jobs as
a result of the loan.");
15. Bd. of Supervisors of Lamar Cnty. v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 448 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1984) (en banc)
(" 'The end being legitimate [here, the relief of
unemployment and the promotion of the state's agricultural
and industrial welfare], the means is for the legislature to
choose.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Albritton v. City of
Winona, 178 So. 799, 804 (Miss. 1938));
16. State ex rel. Wagner v. St. Louis Cnty. Port Auth., 604 S.W.2d
592, 597 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) ("The Court [in an earlier
opinion] held that the issuance of revenue bonds for
commercial, industrial, agricultural and manufacturing
facilities did serve the essential public purposes of improving
employment and stimulating the economy. The same could be
said for the issuance of revenue bonds pursuant to the
purposes of this Act.");
17. Fickes v. Missoula Cnty., 470 P.2d 287, 292 (Mont. 1970)
("The legislative purpose of encouraging the development of
the state's natural resources without cost to the taxpayer is
being accomplished. Here, every dollar expended on the bond
issue is to be repaid from and by the project the issue makes
possible. The county commissioners expressly find the project
will be of value as a source of employment and county
revenue and will protect the health, safety and welfare of the
citizens. The plant will be enabled to comply with the new
legal requirements for environmental improvement. Thus, a
valid public purpose appears.");
18. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Nev.
1973) (upholding a statute "designed to encourage industry to
locate or remain in this State in order to relieve
unemployment and to secure and maintain a stable
economy");
19. Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 843 (N.J. 1964) (noting that the
relevant statute's purpose is to "alleviate unemployment in
localities where that condition has been substantial and
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persistent" and that if the New Jersey area is not found to
suffer from such substantial and persistent unemployment, "it
cannot be designated a redevelopment area");
20. Vill. of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 303 P.2d 920, 928 (N.M. 1956)
("The promotion of the industry authorized by the
hereinbefore mentioned provisions of Chapter 137 is clearly
of incidental public benefit to the municipality where such
industry may be located at least, to the extent that it will
furnish employment to a substantial number of its inhabitants.
It is, then, at least incidentally for a public purpose, though it
results in the promotion of and gain to a private
corporation.");
21. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331
(N.Y. 1975) ("It would not then be necessary, as a
precondition to the taking, to determine that the public
benefit in assuring the retention of Otis as an increased source
of employment opportunity in Yonkers was sufficient to
outweigh the benefit that may be conferred on Otis.");
22. Stark Cnty. v. Ferguson, 440 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981) (" 'To create or preserve jobs and employment
opportunities [or] to improve the economic welfare of the
people of the state . .. is hereby determined to be in the public
interest and a proper public purpose.' " (quoting OHIO
CONST. art. VIII, § 13));
23. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608, 610-11 (Okla. 1989)
(noting that the City of Enid had suffered a "significant
increase in unemployment" and that its plan to purchase a
failing university in the city would preserve "hundreds of jobs
at the university" and have a "significant effect upon the city's
ability to attract new industry and new jobs" ultimately
creating "overwhelming benefits to the community of Enid"
that qualified as a public purpose);
24. Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 248 A.2d 212, 217-
18 (Pa. 1968) (noting that "[a]ll parties are agreed that
unemployment is a problem which falls within the police
power of the state" and that the legislature's actions to quell
unemployment are entitled to deference, and finding that the
projects at bar would "be effective means of combating
unemployment since they will create jobs directly");
25. In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 324 A.2d 641, 647 (R.I.
1974) (per curiam) ("We believe that the conditions of
unemployment within the state are well known and need no
documentation here. Legislation such as that under
consideration here, intended to alleviate these conditions and
their inherent problems, certainly is in the public interest.");
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26. Nichols v. S.C. Research Auth., 351 S.E.2d 155, 163 (S.C.
1986) ("It would be anomalous to hold that a government
which expends hundreds of millions to alleviate the suffering
of its indigent population through multiple social and
humanitarian programs, and properly so, is proscribed from
providing jobs for the unemployed, who, once employed,
contribute tax revenues in support of those very programs."
(footnote omitted));
27. Clem v. City of Yankton, 160 N.W.2d 125, 133 (S.D. 1968)
("[S]timulation and development of our general economic
welfare and prosperity is clearly a public purpose.");
28. West v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 332 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tenn. 1960)
("The stated and obvious purpose of the act in question is to
promote industry and develop trade to provide against low
wages and unemployment. Such a purpose is public in nature
under conditions existing in this State at the time of the
enactment of the law and at the present time.");
29. Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 413 (Utah
1986) ("We cannot say in the face of those precedents that the
stimulation of Utah's economy and the creation of
employment is not a legitimate public purpose.");
30. Vt. Home Mortg. Credit Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank,
262 A.2d 445, 449 (Vt. 1970) (upholding a statute with
legislative findings that "refer to the public purpose and policy
of stimulating industrial growth, utilizing commercial potential
and expanding employment opportunity");
31. City of Charlottesville v. DeHaan, 323 S.E.2d 131, 137 (Va.
1984) (upholding the city's actions where "the city has made
an investment in its future in order to complete a
redevelopment project more than twenty years in the making
and in order to provide jobs, more tax revenues, and other
benefits for its citizens."); Mayor & Members of the City
Council v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 275 S.E.2d 888, 890 (Va. 1981)
("The Act was designed to stimulate the economy of Virginia,
thereby providing jobs, increasing business activity, and
broadening the state's tax base. Appellant argues that the
financing of private projects with industrial development
authority revenue bonds often gives a competitive advantage
to the developer involved. It further argues that such bonds
unfairly compete in the market place with true municipal
bonds issued to finance legitimate public improvements.
While these arguments may have merit, they would more
properly be addressed to the legislative body.");
32. State ex rel. Ohio Cnty. Comm'n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 4
(W. Va. 1980) ("It does not require any lengthy discussion to
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realize that the renovation, expansion or creation of existing
or new commercial projects gives much the same economic
benefit to a community as would comparable activities in the
industrial area. Each serves to create or maintain employment
and enhance tax revenues, and thereby operates to benefit the
community and public in general.");
33. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d
784, 794-95 (Wis. 1973) (noting a legislative statement of
purpose that the court gives deference to, namely that the
state may "promote the right to gainful employment").
A number of cases used broad economic welfare language that,
while not mentioning job creation specifically, arguably encompasses
job creation.
1. Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326, 331 (Alaska 1970)
("[I]t is recognized that the location of an industry in a
particular community may have widespread economic benefits
and that these do fulfill the public purpose and the general
welfare of the community, broadly conceived.");
2. Indus. Dev. Auth. of Pinal Cnty. v. Nelson, 509 P.2d 705, 710
(Ariz. 1973) (en banc) ("The system of financing pollution
control facilities . . . is essentially the same as that provided in
many other states for industrial development. We believe that
the best reasoned cases support the view .. . that such method
of financing .. . is an expenditure in the public interest.");
3. Andres v. First Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp., 324 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ark.
1959) (" 'The purposes of each development finance
corporation organized under the provisions of [the statute are]
to promote, stimulate, develop and advance the business
prosperity and economic welfare of the State of Arkansas and
its citizens.' " (citation omitted));
4. Duckworth v. City of Kansas City, 758 P.2d 201, 203 (Kan.
1988) ("[In previous cases], this court upheld the
constitutionality of governmental assistance of private
economic development for the purpose of promoting the
overall economic welfare of the general public. Although both
cases involve the grants of industrial revenue bonds rather
than the issuance of loans by a city, the analysis for
constitutional purposes is identical.");
5. Chase v. Cnty. of Douglas, 241 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Neb. 1976)
("[T]he general encouragement of growth and industry
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through such devices as publicity and advertising are public
purposes.");
6. Gripentrog v. City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230, 237 (N.D.
1964) (noting that the court upheld [in an earlier opinion] the
public purpose doctrine "for the creation and establishment of
certain State utilities, industries, enterprises, and business
projects");
7. Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 438 P.2d 725, 730-31 (Or. 1968)
("The action of the Port is predicated upon its finding of a
general benefit to the economy of the community. This is a
public purpose.");
8. Powers v. City of Cheyenne, 435 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo. 1967)
("Also, on its face, the project is in pursuance of law (the
Industrial Development Projects Act as amended); and it is
for a public purpose specified by law in the sense that Ch. 95,
§ 1(b), specifies that plants and facilities of industrial




APPENDIX B. CASES CITED IN MAREADY IDENTIFYING INCREASING
THE TAX BASE AS A FACTOR IN HOLDING THAT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES SERVE A PUBLIC PURPOSE
1. Wilson v. Conn. Prod. Dev. Corp., 355 A.2d 72, 76 (Conn.
1974) ("It was their considered opinion that the support of
enterprises eligible for assistance under the act would result in
an improved economy for the people of Connecticut by
helping to keep new business in the state, to provide increased
employment opportunities, and to establish a new source of
public revenues." (emphasis added)); Roan v. Conn. Indus.
Bldg. Comm'n, 189 A.2d 399, 401 (Conn. 1963) (upholding a
statute that would "increase the tax base of the economy");
2. Potter v. Judge, 112 444 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(noting the legislative purpose of "reducing unemployment,
expanding commerce, and enlarging municipal tax bases" and
upholding the statute as serving a proper public purpose);
3. Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797, 799
(Ky. 1987) (upholding a statute as serving a valid public
purpose because the project created "incremental taxes" and
the "Commission has made the necessary findings required by
the statute [including that it] would be economic madness for
Toyota to expend up to $800 million for the plant and then fail
to use it [and that, even] standing idle, the development would
generate additional property taxes");
4. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 20 (Me. 1983) (noting
that the project would "improve commerce and create jobs,
generating sufficient tax revenues to repay the state's
investment");
5. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 335
N.E.2d 362, 363-64 (Mass. 1975) (per curiam) (" 'The
reduction of unemployment and alleviation of economic
distress,' as well as the '[s]timulation of investment and job
opportunity ... are proper public purposes.' " (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v. O'Brien, 524
P.2d 390, 394 (Wash. 1974)));
6. Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319,
323 (Minn. 1984) (en banc) (noting that "the State of
Minnesota will benefit in the form of ... expanded state or
local tax bases");
7. Fickes v. Missoula Cnty., 470 P.2d 287, 292 (Mont. 1970)
("Here, every dollar expended on the bond issue is to be
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repaid from and by the project the issue makes possible. The
county commissioners expressly find the project will be of
value as a source of employment and county revenue and will
protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens."
(emphasis added));
8. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608, 611 (Okla. 1989)
(noting that Enid's purchase of a failing university would
benefit the city's economy by ensuring "the continued
presence of students who spend in Enid," and conceivably
increase tax revenues through such spending);
9. Nichols v. S.C. Research Auth., 351 S.E.2d 155, 163 (S.C.
1986) ("It would be anomalous to hold that a government
which expends hundreds of millions to alleviate the suffering
of its indigent population through multiple social and
humanitarian programs, and properly so, is proscribed from
providing jobs for the unemployed, who, once employed,
contribute tax revenues in support of those very programs."
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted));
10. Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 413 (Utah
1986) (citing Wilson v. Conn. Prod. Dev. Corp., 355 A.2d 72
(Conn. 1974), as support for the proposition that a law that
increases public revenues serves a public purpose);
11. Mayor & Members of the City Council v. Indus. Dev. Auth.,
275 S.E.2d 888, 890 (Va. 1981) ("The Act was designed to
stimulate the economy of Virginia, thereby providing jobs,
increasing business activity, and broadening the state's tax
base." (emphasis added));
12. State ex rel. Ohio Cnty. Comm'n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 4
(W. Va. 1980) ("It does not require any lengthy discussion to
realize that the renovation, expansion or creation of existing
or new commercial projects gives much the same economic
benefit to a community as would comparable activities in the
industrial area. Each serves to create or maintain employment
and enhance tax revenues, and thereby operates to benefit the
community and public in general." (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted));
13. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d
784, 794-95 (Wis. 1973) (deferring to legislative determination
that "security against unemployment and the preservation and
enhancement of the tax base can best be provided by the
promotion, attraction, stimulation, rehabilitation and
revitalization of commerce, industry and manufacturing").
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